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PRODUCT RECALLS: A
REMEDY IN NEED OF
REPAIR
Teresa M. Schwartz*
Robert S. Adler**
rheproduct recall is an eifective tool that protects consumers as well as agencies,
ifpublc particpation is secured promptly This Article focuses on the recall pro-
grams of NHTSA, the FDA, and the CPSC that recall hazardous or unsafe con-
sumer products. The authors propose specifc statutory and administrative changes
to makefederal recallprograms more efcient and to enhance public responsiveness.
They conclude that coordination and uniformity among agencies is necessary to
achieve these goals.
INTRODUCTION
EACH YEAR, manufacturers recall millions of consumer prod-
ucts--ranging from toys and household appliances to drugs
and autos-under an array of federal health and safety statutes.'
Manufacturers undertake most recalls voluntarily, either on their
own initiative or at the urging of a federal agency with recall au-
thority.2 Extensive use of recalls began in the mid-1960's at the
* Professor of Law, The National Law Center, George Washington University.
A.B., Stanford University (1965); J.D., George Washington University (1971).
** Adjunct Professor of Law, American University. A.B., University of Pennsylvania
(1966); J.D., University of Michigan (1969). Mr. Adler is a former Consumer Product
Safety Commission Attorney.
This Article was prepared under a contract with the Administrative Conference of the
United States. The views expressed are the authors' and should not be attributed to the
Administrative Conference.
1. Levy, A Record Year For Recalls, 113 DUN'S REi'., Jan. 1979, at 28. Perhaps as
many as 50 million products were recalled in 1978. ld. In 1982, 4.5 million cars and over
12 million consumer products were recalled (excluding food, drugs, and medical devices).
1983 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 3.
2. In addition to the three agencies examined in this Article, the other federal agen-
cies primarily involved in product recalls are the Environmental Protection Agency (under
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height of the consumer movement and continues, although some-
what abated, in the deregulatory environment of the early 1980's.
The vitality of the recall as an enforcement tool stems from a
number of factors. Agencies tend to prefer the recall over enforce-
ment tools such as product seizure or standard setting because it
better protects consumers and requires fewer agency resources. In
general, firms are motivated to recall products voluntarily to avoid
not only the cost of agency enforcement proceedings and possible
penalties, but also adverse publicity and product liability claims.
The recall remedy, although valuable as an enforcement tool,
is difficult to use effectively. An agency must implement the rem-
edy very promptly if it is to serve its purpose of preventing injury.
Further, the agency must implement it in a way that encourages
public response, for public participation is essential to effective
recalls.
This Article examines the recall programs of three federal
agencies: the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). All have active
recall programs in the area of unsafe or hazardous consumer
products, where effective use of the recall remedy is most
needed-and most difficult.
For purposes of this Article, the term "recall" encompasses a
variety of post-sale remedial actions by product manufacturers
and sellers. These include notifying consumers of problems with
products, offering to repair products, and offering to refund or re-
place products. Each of the three agencies has authority to order
at least one of these post-sale remedial actions. In most other re-
spects, however, the recall programs are quite diverse. The stan-
dards for ordering recalls, the scope of the remedy, and the
administrative procedures of the programs vary among agencies.
Some of the differences are statutorily based; others arise from the
variety of methods used to implement the programs.
This Article recommends a number of statutory changes aimed
the Clean Air Act, the Toxic Substances Act, and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act), the Federal Trade Commission (under the FTC Act), and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture (under the Meat and Poultry Inspection Act). Minutes of Interagency
Meeting on Product Recalls 2 (Mar. 6, 1979) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Interagency Meeting], Other agencies involved in recalls in-
clude the Department of Housing and Urban Development (under the National Mobile
Home Construction and Safety Standards Act), the Federal Aviation Administration
(under the Federal Aviation Act), and the United States Coast Guard (under the Federal
Boat Safety Act). See The Mindless Pursuit of Safety, FoRTUNE, Apr. 9, 1979, at 54-55.
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at improving the agencies' abilities to negotiate recalls and pro-
ceed expeditiously when voluntary recalls are not forthcoming. In
addition, it recommends more uniformity and coordination
among agencies in implementing recall programs and dealing
with the public. The broad goal of these recommendations is
making better use of agency resources and enhancing public re-
sponsiveness to recalls, thereby increasing the overall effectiveness
of federal recall programs.
I. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Among the agencies most actively involved in product recalls
is NHTSA. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 (the Safety Act),3 which granted NHTSA authority to order
recalls of defective motor vehicles, was the first statute to contain a
recall provision.'
Since the enactment of the Safety Act, an extraordinary
number of motor vehicles and equipment have been re-
called-roughly 133 million product units to date.5 As under
other statutes, nearly all the recalls have been undertaken volunta-
rily by manufacturers. And, as is often the case, return rates in
response to recalls have been low.
A. RecallAuthority: Background
Long before federal safety statutes mandated the recall of
automobiles with safety-related defects, the auto industry recalled
and repaired vehicles.6 The government played no role in these
recalls, which manufacturers did not publicize. During this, the
era of the so-called "silent recall,"7 manufacturers notified their
3. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1982)). The Safety Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to implement the recall
provision. 15 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982). The Secretary, however, has delegated this authority
to NHTSA. 49 C.F.R. § 501.2(a) (1983).
4. The FDA obtained product recalls for many years before the enactment of the
Safety Act but it lacked statutory authority to order recalls. See infra notes 307-13 and
accompanying text.
5. COMPTROLLER GEN., GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFF., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA-
TION'S INVESTIGATION OF REAR BRAKE LOCKUP PROBLEMS IN 1980 X-BODY CARS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE TIMELY 3 (Aug. 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as GAO X-BODY
REPORT]. The total includes 101.4 million vehicles, 6.9 million replacement items, and 24.6
million tires recalled from 1966 through April 30, 1983. Id.
6. The earliest known recall involved the 1903 model Packard and occurred at the
turn of the century. Other early recalls involved the 1916 Buick and the 1924 Maxwell.
Levy, supra note 1, at 117.
7. Id.
1984]
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dealers of defects and how to repair them, without informing car
owners.8 They left to the dealers the responsibility for owner noti-
fication. 9 Too often, however, owners neither learned of defects
nor had them corrected unless they serviced their cars with
dealers. '0
By the mid-1960's, manufacturers had recalled a large number
of cars.1I About this time, industry members also began improv-
ing their product recall procedures, a move stimulated by congres-
sional hearings on auto safety, growing public awareness of the
silent recalls, and the large number of vehicles requiring recall. 2
But the industry initiatives came too late to stave off legislation
mandating industry recall procedures.
1. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
In 1966, several members of Congress introduced bills ad-
dressing auto safety; however, neither the major House bill 3 nor
the Senate bill'4 contained a recall or defect notification provision.
Only after concerns about the industry's failure to notify custom-
ers and repair defects surfaced in committee hearings did Con-
gress consider amendments regarding recalls."
The amendment ultimately adopted mandated that manufac-
turers notify initial purchasers of defects, but was silent regarding
the manufacturers' duty to repair defects. 16 Congress thought that
publicity accompanying defect notifications would, as a practical
8. See Note, Auto Recalls and the Pursuit of Safety: A Commonsense Approach, 33
STAN. L. REV. 301, 303 n.9 (1981).
9. Federal Role in Traffic Safety: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reor-
ganization of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Federal Role in Traffic Safety Hearings].
10. See Note, supra note 8, at 303 n.9.
11. Federal Role in Traffic Safety Hearings, supra note 9, at 78. From 1960 to 1966,
426 recalls occurred involving over 8.7 million cars or 18.5% of all American cars manufac-
tured during that period.
12. General Motors (GM), for example, began notifying car owners directly of safety
defects and offering repairs at no charge. Id.
13. H.R. 13,228, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
14. S. 3005, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
15. Senator Mondale introduced an amendment requiring defect notification to elimi-
nate secret recalls. See 112 CONG. REC. 14,247 (1966). Other proposed amendments re-
quired both notification and repair. See 112 CONG. REC. 18,792 (1966).
16. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act of 1966, §§ 113(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 89-
563, 80 Stat. 718 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (a) (1982)). The manufacturer was to
send the notice by certified mail to the first purchaser or to the second purchaser in the case
of a resale when a warranty had been transferred. The notice was to contain a clear de-
scription of the defect, an evaluation of the safety risk, and the measures required to repair
the defect. Id. § 113(c) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (1982)).
[Vol. 34:401
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matter, assure free repairs by manufacturers.' 7
Following the statute's enactment, the industry practice was to
pay for defect corrections. 8 However, in two notable instances,
manufacturers did not offer free defect correction. In one case in-
volving over 625,000 Corvairs with defective heaters, GM refused
to pay the $200-per-vehicle repair costs and only 7.6 percent of the
owners returned their cars for repairs in response to the recall
campaign.' 9 In another case involving Volkswagens manufac-
tured from 1949 to 1969, VW also refused to pay for repairs.2 °
Moreover, it notified only 220,000 of the 3.7 million owners af-
fected, since its records of first purchasers dated back only to 1966,
when the Safety Act's recordkeeping requirements took effect.2 '
While there were smaller recall campaigns in which manufactur-
ers refused to pay for repairs,22 the Corvair and VW cases focused
Congress' attention on the need for strengthening the recall provi-
sions of the Safety Act.23
2. The 1974 Amendments
In 1974, Congress amended the Safety Act to require manufac-
turers to remedy safety defects without charge to the owner. 24 Ad-
dressing the inadequate notice of the VW recall, Congress also
required manufacturers to provide defect notifications to all state-
17. Auto Safety Repairs at No Cost: Hearings on S. 355 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on No Cost
Repairs].
18. The Administrator of NHTSA testified that the industry offered to repair about
90% of the 40 million vehicles recalled between 1966 and 1973. In 10% of the cases, the cost
was borne by the owner or shared by the manufacturer and owner. Id. at 8.
19. S. REP. No. 150, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). In addition to GM's refusal to pay
for repairs, several factors contributed to the low rate of return by Corvair owners. First,
owners had no assurance that the repairs would last. Id. Second, the market value of
many of the recalled vehicles had fallen below $500 by the time GM sent the defect notice
in 1971. Finally, the defect notification letter gave mixed signals because NHTSA allowed
GM to include a denial that the Corvair was defective. See Hearings on No Cost Repairs,
supra note 17, at 104-05 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
20. S. REP. No. 150, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). A set screw in the windshield wiper
system would loosen, causing the system to fail without warning.
21. Hearings on No Cost Repairs, supra note 17, at 17.
22. See id. at 341-42.
23. The Senate viewed the two cases as the most "notable instances" in which the auto
industry had reneged on its promise to remedy defects at no charge. S. REP. No. 150, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1982). Congress permitted only two exceptions to the repair-at-
no-cost requirement. The requirement did not apply to defective vehicles purchased more
than eight years before the defect notification was ordered, id. § 1414(a)(4), or to a defect
determined by NHTSA to be "inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety." Id.
§ 1417.
1984]
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registered vehicle owners, not only first purchasers.2 5 Congress
hoped that these provisions not only would eliminate the
problems exemplified by the VW and Corvair recalls, but also
would improve the average response rate for all recall
26campaigns.
The 1974 amendments did not achieve the desired effect.
Since their passage, owner response rates have dropped to about
fifty percent.2 7  To understand why the recall remedy has not
worked as well as Congress had hoped requires a closer look at
the nature of the recall authority and its implementation by
NHTSA.
B. Scope of Recall Authority
The Safety Act provides for the recall of vehicles that do not
comply with an applicable federal motor vehicle safety standard28
or contain a "defect" which "relates to motor vehicle safety.
21 9
The courts, in a handful of cases, have interpreted the latter provi-
sion to give NHTSA broad recall authority.
1. The Meaning of "Defect"
In the leading case defining defect, United States v. General
25. Id. § 1413(c). If the manufacturer does not notify the registered owner, it must
notify the most recent purchaser known to it. Id.
26. The purpose of the 1974 amendments was to make it "as attractive and convenient
as possible for a consumer to invest the energy and effort to get his or her vehicle fixed." S.
REP. No. 150, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1973). At the time, recall response rates averaged
75%. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6050-51.
27. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFF., CHANGES TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE RECALL PRO-
GRAMS COULD REDUCE POTENTIAL SAFETY HAZARDS 15 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GAO
RECALL REPORT]. NHTSA's recall rates for 1975 through 1979 are as follows:
1975 54.2%
1976 51.1%
1977 40.1%
1978 50.4%
1979 54.8%
Average: 50.1%
Id. For the past several years, however, return rates have been above average. See infra
note 134.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982). Section 103 of the 1966 Safety Act, id. § 1392, provides
for the issuance of motor vehicle safety standards to protect the public against unreasona-
ble risks. Few recalls, however, are based on noncompliance with safety standards. In
1979, for example, only about 49,000 vehicles were recalled because of noncompliance with
standards. NHTSA, U.S. DEP'T. OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY 1979, at 45-46 (on
file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter cited as 1979 NHTSA AN-
NUAL REPORT].
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982).
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Motors Corp. (Wheels),3o the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that a prima facie case of defect is made
upon a showing of a significant number of failures during "nor-
mal operations," which includes circumstances of "reasonably
foreseeable" owner misuse.3' Proof of a significant number of
failures (other than those due to age or expected wear and tear),
the court held, creates a presumption that the failures occurred in
normal use.32 The manufacturer can only rebut the presumption
by establishing an affirmative defense that the failures were due to
"gross and unforeseeable" owner abuse or neglect.33  As thus
broadly interpreted by the court, defect means only that the vehi-
cle failures must be systematic and not isolated incidents.
2. The Meaning of "Motor Vehicle Safety"
The Safety Act's requirement that the defect "relate to motor
vehicle safety" limits the types of defects which trigger recall to
those posing an "unreasonable risk" of accident or injury.34 The
concept of unreasonable risk, however, is not defined by the stat-
ute, and the legislative history suggests little more than that it re-
quires a "commonsense" 35 balancing of safety benefits and
30. 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The case involved the failure of Kelsey-Hayes
wheels in GM pickups. At the time of trial 436 wheel failures had been reported to
NHTSA. Id. at 430. GM argued that the wheels were not defective and the failures were
due to owner misuse in overloading the trucks contrary to GM's instructions. Id. at 426.
31. Id. at 427. After examining the legislative history, the court concluded that Con-
gress intended the statute to provide protection broad enough to cover even "lackadaisical"
car owners who, for example, neglected regular car maintenance. Id. at 434.
32. Id. at 438. The court did not require the government to pinpoint the cause of the
failures. Id. at 427. Nor did the court quantify the term "significant," except to say that it
was more than de minimis but need not be a substantial percentage of the total number of
units. "Significant" would be determined case by case, based on the failure rate of a com-
ponent compared to the rates of similar components, and the seriousness of the risk posed
by the failures. Id. at 438 n.84.
33. Id. at 438. The court's example of an unforeseeable use-loading a 3 4-ton truck
with 12,000 pounds-indicates the difficulty the defendant faces in proving widespread
unforeseeable use. Id. at 438-39 n.88.
34. The Safety Act defines "motor vehicle safety" as
the performance of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment in such a manner
that the public is protected against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring as a
result of the design, construction or performance of motor vehicles and is also
protected against unreasonable risk of death or injury to persons in the event acci-
dents do occur, and includes nonoperational safety of such vehicles.
15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
35. Traffic Safety: Hearings on S, 3005 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1966). Although ill-defined, the term "motor vehicle safety" was con-
sidered one of the "critical" definitions delimiting the bill's scope. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2713.
1984]
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economic costs. The courts have interpreted the unreasonable risk
requirement liberally to promote the statute's safety aims.
In the leading case of United States v. General Motors Corp.
(Pitman Arms) ,36 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit ruled in a brief per curiam opinion that a defect "relat-
ing to motor vehicle safety" existed in the steering pitman arm of
the 1959-60 Cadillac. The court based its finding on the govern-
ment's showing that the manufacturer had replaced many more
pitman arms for that model year than for adjacent model years,
and failures could cause the driver to lose control of the car.37 On
these uncontradicted facts, the court reversed a denial of the gov-
ernment's summary judgment motion. 38  The government had
demonstrated neither injury nor death resulting from pitman arm
failures.39 General Motors argued that the defect posed no unrea-
sonable risk because failures only occurred at low speeds and so
few 1959-60 Cadillacs were still in use that the risk of injury was
minimal. The court of appeals found that the government's evi-
dence of one pitman arm failure, creating a dangerous situation,
plus expert testimony on the danger of a sudden loss of steering
even at low speeds,4' not only established a prima facie case of
unreasonable risk, but also overcame GM's evidence as a matter
of law.42
The same court of appeals took a similar approach in United
36. 561 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978).
37. Id. at 924.
38. Id. The district court had denied summary judgment to both parties. 65 F.R.D.
115 (D.D.C. 1974).
39. Sixty-four "confirmed" instances of pitman arm failures and two "reportable acci-
dents" occurred. Id. at 937 (Leventhal, J., dissenting in part). However, this could repre-
sent a "minuscule sample" of the failures in light of the large number of replacement part
sales. Id.
40. GM had forecast less than a one percent chance of a fatality and only two possible
injuries for those 1959-60 Cadillacs still in use over their remaining three-year life expec-
tancy. Id. at 936.
41. The government presented direct testimony of one driver who had experienced a
steering loss during a 90-degree turn at 10-15 miles per hour. An expert testified that while
the median reaction time to a brake failure was 1.6 seconds, a pitman arm failure during a
5-mile-per-hour, 90-degree turn could cause the car to enter the opposing traffic lane in
only 1.5 seconds. Id. at 927.
42. But see id. at 938 (Leventhal, J., dissenting in part). Judge Leventhal believed that
the majority had improperly elevated facts giving rise to a "strong suspicion" of dangerous-
ness to a "conclusive presumption" that the defect posed an unreasonable risk. He would
have remanded the case on the grounds that the district court had erred in allocating the
burden of proof. On remand, he would have permitted GM to dispel the "strong suspi-
don" that the defect was dangerous with proof that the failures did not occur in dangerous
situations and thus the risk was inconsequential. Id.
[Vol. 34:401
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States v. General Motors Corp. (Quadrajet), which involved risks
of underhood fires caused by defective carburetor fuel plugs. 43 In
upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
government, the court ruled that even if GM's risk analy-
sis-showing negligible future failures, less than one injury, and
no deaths-was valid, it would not defeat the government's case.
4
The court found that even an "exceedingly small" number of inju-
ries from this admittedly defective and clearly dangerous carbure-
tor appeared to be "unreasonably large."
45
In theory, these cases give NHTSA expansive authority to or-
der recalls even where safety-related defects pose minimal risk. In
practice, however, the Agency's authority is more limited. An ex-
amination of NHTSA's implementation of the recall program
reveals some of these limits.
C. Implementing the Recall Authority
1. Finding the Defects
NHTSA learns of possible safety-related defects in a variety of
ways. It may discover defects through its own vehicle testing46 or
through service bulletins that the Agency requires manufacturers
to submit.47 Perhaps the most important source of information is
its Auto Safety Hotline, which receives some 500 calls a day.48 To
obtain further information, NHTSA sends follow-up question-
naires to callers complaining about possible defects. The Agency
43. 565 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Six hundred sixty-five incidents of underhood fires
had been reported, and GM had conceded the existence of a "defect" in its carburetors. Id.
at 756.
44. Id. at 758. One reason for GM's anticipation of few additional incidents was that
the administrative and litigation phases of the case had consumed so much time that many
of the cars involved were no longer in use or the problem had corrected itself. Id. The
court was necessarily reluctant to relieve the manufacturer of its statutory duty on this
basis; to do so would "establish a system which encourages manufacturers to delay pro-
ceedings whenever possible . Id. at 759.
45. Id. at 759.
46. NHTSA tests a sampling of vehicles and equipment to determine compliance with
safety standards. 1979 NHTSA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 45. Few recalls, how-
ever, result from noncompliance testing. See supra note 28.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1418(a)(1) (1982) requires manufacturers to supply NHTSA with cop-
ies of all notices to dealers and purchasers "regarding any defect or failure to comply [with
a standard]." NHTSA's regulations require manufacturers to submit all service bulletins
and other communications with dealers, distributors, etc., regarding any defect or flaw
"whether or not [it] is safety-related." 49 C.F.R. § 573.8 (1983). This requirement provides
NHTSA with general information about potential defects that may warrant further
investigation.
48. See 1979 NHTSA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 44; GAO RECALL REPORT,
supra note 27, at 30-31.
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stores the responses and complaint letters it receives-which may
number 3,000 a month-in a computerized database that can
identify trends and give the Agency early warning about possible
safety-related defects.49  Many defect investigations and subse-
quent recalls originate with consumer complaints.5 °
Another important source of information about defects is the
manufacturer. As in other recall programs, manufacturers are
statutorily obligated to report defects and are subject to civil pen-
alties for failing to do so.5 The reporting requirement, however,
has not been as important a factor in initiating recalls under the
Safety Act as it has been under other acts,5 2 and the civil penalty
provision is largely unused.5 3 This is because the Safety Act's re-
porting provision is narrower than others and does not require
reporting of potential problems that "could create" a serious haz-
ard.5 4 The reporting obligation arises only when the manufac-
turer has determined "in good faith" that a defect relates to motor
vehicle safety and the statute requires a recall. 55 Under this stan-
dard, manufacturers do initiate numerous recalls,5 6 but these are
generally on a smaller scale. The large-scale recalls are initiated
primarily by the government on the basis of consumer
49. GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 30-31.
50. Telephone Interview with David Allen, Office of General Counsel of NHTSA, in
Washington, D.C. (July 14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Allen Interview].
51. Failure to notify NHTSA and recall defective products under 15 U.S.C. § 1411
(1982) are prohibited acts under § 1397(a)(1)(D) (1982), which subjects violators to civil
penalties up to $800,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1398(a) (1982).
52. In the CPSC's program, manufacturers' reports have been key factors in initiating
recalls. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
53. Allen Interview, supra note 50. Penalties were assessed in the Toyota Hilux
Pickup shimmy recall case, however, and NHTSA threatened additional penalties if the
manufacturer did not agree to undertake the recall expeditiously. Interview with Raymond
A. Peck, Jr., former Administrator, NHTSA, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 4, 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Peck Interview].
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1982). Compare the Safety Act's requirement with that of the
Consumer Product Safety Act, excerpted infra note 21 .
55. Section 151 of the Safety Act provides:
If a manufacturer-
(1) obtains knowledge that any motor vehicle or item of replacement equip-
ment manufactured by him contains a defect and determines in good faith that
such defect relates to motor vehicle safety. . . he shall furnish notification to the
Secretary and to owners, purchasers, and dealers.. . and he shall remedy [by
repair, refund, or replacement] the defect ....
15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1982). The provision also calls for reporting noncompliance with safety
standards and recalling those products as well. See id.
56. Tobin, Recalls and the Remediation of Hazardous or Defective Consumer Products
The Sx'erience of the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the National Highway
Traffic SafetyAdministration, 16 J. CONs. AFF. 278, 288 (1982). Between 1966 and 1981,
3,265 au o recalls occurred, 83.4% of which were manufacturer initiated. Id.
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complaints.57
NHTSA may not need to rely as heavily as other agencies
upon manufacturer-supplied defect information, inasmuch as ve-
hicle owners do complain and thus provide the Agency with a
good database. Nevertheless, Congress should strengthen the
Safety Act's reporting requirement. A provision resembling that
of the Consumer Product Safety Act5" or one imposing an affirma-
tive obligation to report specific data such as warranty claims and
product liability suits, 59 would improve agency efficiency and ef-
fectiveness. With a stronger provision, NHTSA would receive in-
formation about possible defects that complainants do not
report.60 Moreover, a more stringent requirement would reduce
agency time and resources required to gather defect information.6
This benefit is especially important if the remedy is to work, be-
cause of the need for dispatch in recall cases.62 Additionally, the
need for agency cost-cutting makes this benefit important. 63 Sanc-
tions for failure to report would generate an additional benefit.
As the CPSC has learned, an.agency can use the threat of substan-
tial timeliness penalties to induce otherwise recalcitrant manufac-
57. Id. at 289. Between 1966 and 1981, the number of vehicles in manufacturer-initi-
ated recalls averaged 17,738, compared with 90,306 for government-initiated recalls. Over
half of tie vehicles recalled were in government-initiated recalls. Id.
58. 5ee infra note 211.
59. For example, Congress could require manufacturers to notify NHTSA of lawsuits
in which - defect is claimed, or to provide information on warranty claims which arise
frequently enough to indicate a possible pattern of defect. Interview with Clarence M.
Ditlow III, Director of the Center for Auto Safety, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 29, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Ditlow Interview]. According to former NHTSA Administrator Peck,
however, increased reporting requirements would add little additional information, since
NHTSA is able to obtain all necessary data regarding warranty claims, consumer com-
plaints, product liability suits, etc., by requesting it from the manufacturer early in the
investigation of a potential problem. See Peck Interview, supra note 53. One difficulty
with this view is that NHTSA may lack sufficient information to prompt it to request data
from the manufacturer.
60. Car owners may have no reason to inform NHTSA about problems with products
covered by warranty, even though they may indicate a defect, if the manufacturer or dealer
satisfactorily and promptly resolves warranty claims. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59.
61. Although NHTSA seeks information from the manufacturer early in an investiga-
tion, see rupra note 59, some manufacturers have construed NHTSA's requests narrowly
and have failed to provide the necessary information. Additional requests or negotiations
are then required. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59. This process could be streamlined by
expanding the manufacturer's reporting obligation.
62. The longer the delay in issuing the recall notice, the less effective the remedy be-
comes. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
63. rhe Reagan Administration has made significant cuts in NHTSA's budget. Fund-
ing of N HTSA's defect investigation and enforcement activities, however, has remained at
about the same level. Peck Interview, supra note 53.
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turers to undertake comprehensive product recalls. 64
2. The Investigation Stage
An automobile is a complex product with roughly 14,000
parts.65 Thus, NHTSA's investigation of a potential safety defect
can be complex and lengthy. While a manufacturer may agree to
recall vehicles at any time during an investigation,66 in the ab-
sence of voluntary recall NHTSA follows certain defect-investiga-
tion procedures. When it has grounds to believe that a safety-
related defect exists, the Agency first undertakes an "informal in-
quiry"-a limited investigation consisting of meetings and tele-
phone conversations with the car manufacturer to identify the
problem. 67 If NHTSA decides to proceed further, it then under-
takes an engineering analysis of the problem. Early in this stage,
it sends the manufacturer an information request letter seeking
detailed information about the item in question.6 The staff exam-
ines other data as well, and may perform tests to determine the
cause and scope of the problem.69 This stage often takes years to
complete. A notorious example is NHTSA's recent analysis of
GM's X-body rear brake lockup problem, which spanned
nineteen months.70 Critics have attributed the overall delay to the
Agency's past practice of opening more engineering analyses than
were warranted or than it could handle.7" A broader initial defect
64. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
65. Recalls: Why They Occur, How to Answer One on Your Car, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec.
5, 1983, at 6 (General Motors' advertisement) [hereinafter cited as GM Recall Ad-
vertisement].
66. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59. The manufacturer may decide to recall before an
investigation is begun or in the preliminary stages of an investigation.
67. J. CLAYBROOK, J. GILLAN & A. STRAINCHAMPS, REAGAN ON THE ROAD: THE
CRASH OF THE U.S. AUTO SAFETY PROGRAM 62 (Sept. 1982) [hereinafter cited as AUTO
SAFETY REPORT]. The "informal inquiry" is a recent Agency creation designed to permit
informal and prompt investigation of some problems without first undertaking an engi-
neering analysis. Peck Interview, supra note 53.
68. GAO X-BoDY REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
69. GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 31. NHTSA staff examines hotline com-
plaints, accident reports, and the manufacturer's service bulletins. Id.
70. See GAO X-BODY REPORT, supra note 5, at 8-9. The engineering analysis was
inactive for 13 months from November 1979 to December 1980. Transmittal of the infor-
mation request letter, which agency guidelines require during the first two weeks of the
engineering analysis, did not occur until May 1980. Id.
71. GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 6-7. The ratio of about one recall to
every five engineering analyses undertaken may indicate that the Agency opens analyses on
the basis of too few complaints. The use of informal inquiries may reduce the number of
engineering analyses that NHTSA must open. See supra note 67. But see AUTO SAFETY
REPORT, supra note 67, at 63 (favoring engineering analyses as "essential tools for con-
sumer groups and engineering firms interested in getting defects corrected").
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reporting requirement, as recommended earlier, might alleviate
the problem somewhat, since NHTSA could then employ fewer
engineering analyses for purposes of obtaining defect information
from manufacturers.72
Following the engineering analysis, an NHTSA review panel
composed of staff from the Office of Defects Investigation and the
Chief Counsel's Office determines whether a formal defect investi-
gation should be opened.73 If NHTSA chooses formal investiga-
tion, it notifies the manufacturer, issues a press release to inform
and solicit information from the public,74 and collects further
data.75 It may also conduct additional tests, interview vehicle
owners, and gather tangible evidence such as vehicle parts, to es-
tablish legally and technically that a defect is safety related.76
This stage also may be lengthy, especially when the defect is diffi-
cult to uncover.77
3. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings
At the close of a formal investigation, staff members prepare
an investigative report for the Chief Counsel and recommend
either making an initial determination of defect or closing the
case.78 If they recommend a defect determination and the Chief
Counsel and Deputy Administrator concur, the NHTSA notifies
the manufacturer of the determination and publishes a public no-
tice in the Federal Register.79 During the final stage of the admin-
istrative process, the manufacturer may dispute the initial
determination of defect in a public administrative hearing.8° If
the determination is reaffirmed, the Agency orders the manufac-
turer to notify vehicle owners and dealers of the defect and pro-
vide a remedy without charge.8 The notice must include a
72. Lack of information has been one impetus for NHTSA's numerous informal in-
quiries and engineering analyses. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59.
73. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 554.1-.11 (1983).
74. In a number of recent instances, NHTSA did not issue a press release although the
regulations call for one. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59.
75. Id.; see GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 32.
76. GAO X-BODY REPORT, supra note 5, at 41; see also 49 C.F.R. § 554.5 (1983).
77. See, e.g., GAO X-BoDY REPORT, supra note 5, at 50-63 (describing some technical
problems involved in testing for rear brake lockup in GM's X-body cars).
78. Id. at 41-42.
79. Id. at 42; see 15 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(2) (1982). At the hearing, the manufacturer and interested
persons may present data and arguments regarding the initial defect determination or non-
compliance with a standard, but no right to cross examination exists. Regulations gov-
erning the public hearing are set forth at 49 C.F.R. § 554.10(b)-(d) (1983).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1412(b) (1982).
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description of the defect, an evaluation of the risk, and informa-
tion on how and when the defect will be remedied.82
If the manufacturer does not comply with the recall order, the
government may bring an enforcement action in federal district
court.83 Review is de novo, with the burden on the government to
establish the existence of a safety-related defect.84 The district
court will order the recall if the government prevails, and in some
instances may impose civil penalties on the manufacturer.
If a manufacturer knew of a safety-related defect but failed to
recall the affected product, NHTSA may bypass the administra-
tive hearing and seek a court-ordered recall directly.86 The gov-
ernment recently took this approach in a proceeding against
General Motors. Among the allegations is GM's failure to recall
all 1980 X-body cars despite knowledge that the braking system
was defective.87 GM moved to dismiss, arguing that the govern-
ment could not proceed in district court without first having con-
ducted an administrative hearing; the court rejected this
contention in denying the motion.88 Nevertheless, cases of bad
faith which would justify bypass of the administrative hearing are
likely to be rare and hard to prove.
Generally, NHTSA must resort to a two-tiered procedural
82. Id. § 1413(a)(1)-(3) (1982). The notice must also describe consumer complaint
procedures in the event the manufacturer fails to remedy the defect without charge. Id.
§ 1413(a)(6).
83. Id. §§ 1415(a), 1399(a).
84. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 426 & n.7 (D.C. Cir.
1975). NHTSA may require the manufacturer to issue a provisional notification of defect
while the civil action is proceeding. 15 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1982).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1) (1982). The manufacturer's failure to comply with an ad-
ministrative recall order is a prohibited act under the statute which can subject the violator
to civil penalties up to $800,000 for a related series of violations. Id. §§ 1397(a)(1)(D),
1398(a).
86. Section 151 of the Safety Act provides that if the manufacturer obtains informa-
tion that a defect exists and determines in "good faith" that it is safety related, it must
notify NHTSA and recall the product. Id. § 1411; see supra note 55 (text of § 151). Fail-
ure to comply with this requirement is a direct statutory violation which a court may en-
join. See id. §§ 1397, 1399.
87. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for Civil Penalties at 3,
United States v. General Motors Corp., No. 83-2220 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 3, 1983) (alleging
(I) that before beginning production GM knew "or in good faith should have determined"
that the braking system on 1980 X-body cars was defective; (2) that GM's 1981 and 1983
recalls were inadequate; and (3) that GM provided false statements to NHTSA during its
investigation). The government seeks recall of about 1.1 million 1980 X-body cars and
over $4 million in civil penalties. Id. at 10-13. For a further description of the claims, see
GAO X-BODY REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
88. United States v. General Motors Corp., [1983] PROD. SAFETY & LILAB. REP. (BNA)
941-42 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 1983).
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scheme requiring both an agency hearing and a trial de novo in
district court. The process is time consuming even when it works
smoothly, which often it does not. Delays at the investigation
stage are not uncommon.89 The manufacturer also has an induce-
ment to delay the administrative process, since the statute of limi-
tations on the no-charge repair requirement relieves the
manufacturer of the obligation to repair defective vehicles more
than eight years old at the time of defect notification.9° If a case
progresses through both administrative and judicial proceedings,
it can easily span five or more years.9 ' At that point, an effective
recall is unlikely, since most injuries already have occurred. Fur-
thermore, experience has shown that the rate of consumer re-
sponse to recalls drops as vehicles age. In Quadrajet, for example,
the court noted that by the time defect notification was ordered,
most, if not all, defect-related injuries had already occurred.92
The cars at issue in Pitman Arms were nearly twenty years old by
the time the court of appeals ruled in favor of the government; 93 at
the time of the Wheels decision the vehicles involved were ten to
fifteen years old.94 Not surprisingly, the response rates to the re-
calls in NHTSA's litigated cases have been low-ranging from 8
percent to 20.5 percent. 95
4. Implementation through Negotiation
The vast majority of recalls are manufacturer initiated or ne-
gotiated by NHTSA without ligitation.96 The time-consuming
89. See GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 10-11.
90. See supra note 24; see also Ditlow Interview, supra note 59.
91. GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 6, 45-46. NHTSA's litigated cases have
taken from 67 to 86 months to complete. Even in relatively uncomplicated cases, the litiga-
tion phase alone can take three years, as in the case of defective windshield wipers in
Mercury Capris which Ford did not appeal. Affidavit of Lynn L. Bradford, Associate Ad-
ministrator for Enforcement of NHTSA, Joint Appendix at 335, Center for Auto Safety,
Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bradford Affidavit]. In
Centerfor Auto Safe y, the court upheld NHTSA's decision to settle rather than litigate, in
part because litigation would have taken at least four years. 685 F.2d at 663.
92. 565 F.2d 754, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
93. 561 F.2d 923, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The case involved 1959-60 Cadillacs. By
1974, an estimated 96% of the model's service life had expired. Id. at 935.
94. 518 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (involving trucks manufactured from 1960 to
1965).
95. See GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 6, 46.
96. Aside from a few early litigated cases, brought to establish the Safety Act's param-
eters, NHTSA has seldom used litigation to enforce the statute. GAO RECALL REPORT,
supra note 27, at 46. The last trial under the recall provision occurred in 1978 and the last
suit brought following an administrative hearing was filed in 1980 and settled in 1981.
Allen Interview, supra note 50. The recent GM X-body case is therefore unusual not only
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procedural scheme provides the Agency with a strong incentive to
settle its cases. 97 In addition, manufacturers' concerns about ad-
verse publicity and risks of product liability claims encourage
them to seek a prompt accord. 98
a. Inducements to Recall. Adverse publicity is of prime con-
cern to manufacturers. 99 When a manufacturer resists a recall re-
quest and NHTSA pursues its investigation, considerable
publicity may occur, causing an adverse effect on sales.' 00 Ford
Motor Company recently acknowledged that although two recent
recalls hurt its image, to have moved slowly or not at all would
have been far more damaging to the company's reputation.'0 '
Another inducement to manufacturer-initiated recalls is the risk
of product liability claims, another major concern for manufactur-
ers. 10 2  A prompt recall can prevent injuries and thus reduce,
although not eliminate entirely, product liability claims.'0 3 Fur-
thermore, if a manufacturer fails to recall a defective product
promptly, it may be liable for punitive damages.'
because of the legal issues raised, see supra note 87 and accompanying text, but also be-
cause such litigation is rare.
97. Peck Interview, supra note 53. In the Fiat premature rust case, for example,
NHTSA sought settlement after years of administrative and judicial proceedings, in part
because the defective cars were 11 years old and the recall was rapidly becoming an ineffec-
tive remedy. In the end, the parties abandoned recall and repair in favor of repurchasing
the cars at their retail price on the date proceedings commenced. Id.; see also infra note
122 and accompanying text (discussing Ford transmission case).
98. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
99. Panel Discussion, Recalls: FDA, CPSC, NHTSA, and Products Liability Consid-
erations, ABA Annual Convention in Atlanta, Georgia (Aug. 2, 1983) (attended by author
Schwartz) [hereinafter cited as ABA Panel Discussion].
100. See Brown, Industry on the Rebound: Detroit Has Learned Some Hard Lessons,
Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1983, at FI, col. 4 (indicating that publicity surrounding NHTSA's
investigation of X-body braking defects had caused sales to drop sharply in a single year).
But see infra note 109 (recalls may not affect market share). GM recently announced plans
to discontinue all X-body cars by 1986. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 16, 1984, at 4-1, col. 1.
101. Ford Finds Recall a Better Ideafor Flaws, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1983, at Fl, ol. I.
102. See, e.g., Address by James T. O'Reilly, Proctor & Gamble Co., to Chemical Spe-
cialties Manufacturers Association (May 21, 1983), reprinted in 11983] PROD. SAFETY &
LIAB. REP. (BNA) 321 (urging manufacturers to recall defective products quickly and effi-
ciently to limit product liability claims).
103. Not all car owners receive the recall notice, and many of those who do fail to
respond. Moreover, receipt of a notice may not be adequate proof that an owner assumed
the risk. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (describing inadequacies of recall
letters).
104. A manufacturer who has learned of a dangerous defect and fails to correct it may
incur liability for punitive damages. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir.
1973).
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b. Inducements Not to Recall. The same factors that en-
courage recalls also can work to discourage them. For example,
once a manufacturer has recalled a product, its product liability
exposure may actually increase. In a product liability trial, evi-
dence of the recall campaign may be admissible to show that the
automobile in question was defective when it left the manufac-
turer. 0 5 Furthermore, the publicity accompanying recalls often
increases the number of claims by informing those who have had
accidents involving recalled vehicles that the defect may have
caused the mishap.'0 6 Thus, in situations where a recall would be
large and expensive and anticipated product liability suits few,
paying the claimants may cost less than a recall. 07 In these in-
stances, the threat of product liability claims provides little in-
ducement to recall. Finally, publicity may discourage recalls by
giving a possible edge to competitors-they may use the manufac-
turer's recall rate to disparage its products, as demonstrated by a
recent advertisement touting Chrysler's relatively low recall
rate.10 8 While manufacturers may overestimate the adverse im-
pact of recall-related publicity, I0 9 this concern nevertheless deters
them from reporting defects and undertaking voluntary recalls.1 0
105. E.g., Kane v. Ford Motor Co., 450 F.2d 315, 316 (3d Cir. 1971); Manieri v. Volks-
wagenwerk A.G., 376 A.2d 1317, 1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). But see Vockie v.
General Motors Corp., 66 F.R.D. 57 (E.D. Pa.), af'd, 523 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975); Landry
v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. Ct. App. 1973). One court has reasoned that given the mil-
lions of recall letters each year, refusing to admit evidence of the recall would be prejudi-
cial to the plaintiff, since "failure to mention the letters might cause jurors to believe the
claimed defect was a solitary one and did not in fact exist." Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d
1, 11, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 877 (1976).
106. ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 99. Firms expect the number of product liabil-
ity claims involving a recalled product to jump markedly soon after the recall announce-
ment. Id.
107. In a pending case involving the potential recall of 5.3 million GM cars with alleg-
edly defective rear axles, the company has estimated that the $125 million recall would
prevent some 16 injury-causing accidents-roughly $8 million in recall costs for each in-
jury. Wall St. J., May 5, 1983, at 4, col. 2. If these projections are correct, they may suggest
to GM that paying the product liability claims would be less costly than recall.
108. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1983, at A23, col. 1. Chrysler claimed in a full-page adver-
tisement that it had recalled only 6% of its 1982-83 models compared with Ford's 26% and
GM's 12%. GM responded with a full-page advertisement on its recall program, explain-
ing that recalls by the nation's largest auto producer may be more noticeable. See GM
Recall Advertisement, supra note 65.
109. See Wayne & Hoffer, Auto Recalls: Do They Affect Market Share?, 8 EcON. 157
(1976) (concluding that unless recalls are highly concentrated in a short period of time, they
have little impact on market share); see also Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1983, at 31, col. 4 (describ-
ing Subaru's popularity despite the fact that Subaru has recalled more cars than it has
sold).
110. Cf. infra note 223 and accompanying text (publicity deters defect reporting).
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c. Resisting Settlement: The Ford Transmission Case. On the
whole, the informal negotiation process yields satisfactory results.
If, however, a manufacturer refuses a recall request and exhibits a
willingness to avoid recall by fully exhausting available adminis-
trative and judicial procedures, NHTSA has, as a practical matter,
no satisfactory recourse. Absent recall, existing procedures do not
provide an effective remedy. 11' The Agency can close the case"'
or try to negotiate a remedy short of a recall, but these solutions
do not effectively further the aims of the Safety Act.
A case in point is NHTSA's recent settlement with Ford Motor
Company. The case involved some twenty-three million Ford
automobiles equipped with automatic transmissions manufac-
tured between 1966 and 1979. 1 An alleged defect in the trans-
missions caused them to slip out of park into reverse-which in
turn caused sudden, unexpected rearward movement of the cars,
commonly when drivers were outside. 14
The Ford transmission case began when the Center for Auto
Safety forwarded two consumer complaints to NHTSA. 15 The
Agency conducted a thirty-month investigation" t6 during which it
received over 23,000 reports of park-to-reverse incidents.' It
made an initial determination of a safety-related defect and held a
three-day public hearing. "8 Ford consistently maintained that its
111. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
112. The Agency has closed several cases after unsuccessfully urging recalls. Wall St.
J., June 16, 1983, at 1, col. 6. Former NHTSA Administrator Peck explained, however,
that NHTSA often urged manufacturers to undertake recalls before completing a thorough
investigation. If the company agrees to recall, the Agency has saved resources; if it does
not, further investigation may reveal no grounds for a recall and the case will be closed.
Peck Interview, supra note 53.
113. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1983, at All, col. 1. The figure represents nearly 20% of all
vehicles on the road. Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
114. 685 F.2d at 657.
115. See Letter from Clarence M. Ditlow III, Director of the Center for Auto Safety, to
Joan Claybrook, Administrator of the NHTSA (July 6, 1977) (on file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review).
116. The investigation has been characterized as "the largest and most difficult and
complex. . . ever conducted by NHTSA." Bradford Affidavit, supra note 91, at 333. It
encompassed six different automatic transmissions on all Ford makes and models from
1970 through 1979. Id. at 333-34.
117. The complaints derived from a variety of sources such as state and local consumer
groups, individual vehicle owners, and police reports. They also resulted from NHTSA
surveys of vehicle fleet owners (police departments and commercial and government fleet
operators) and persons who had called the Agency's hotline. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants
at 5 n.1, Centerfor Auto Safety, 685 F.2d 656.
118. Brief for Appellees at 7-9, Centerfor Auto Safety. Following the public hearing,
NHTSA Administrator Claybrook intended to make a final determination that vehicles
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vehicles were not defective and refused to recall them. 119 Since
over ninety percent of its automatic transmission cars made be-
tween 1966 and 1979 were involved, a recall would have cost
about $130 million.'2 Ford left little doubt that it would fight the
recall vigorously at every stage of the lengthy process.'1
2
NHTSA settled the case without negotiating a recall. Among
the prominent factors leading to its decision were the time re-
quired to pursue the case'2 2 and the drain on agency resources
that litigation would create. 23 Under the terms of the settlement,
Ford was to mail vehicle owners a letter informing them of
NHTSA's defect determination, along with a self-sticking warning
label to affix to their dashboards. The label reminded drivers to
put the gear in park, set the parking brake, and turn off the igni-
tion before leaving the driver's seat.24
Consumer advocates unsuccessfully challenged the settlement.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld
the settlement, ruling that the Safety Act did not compel the recall
containing four of the six transmission types investigated were defective. This would have
required Ford to recall some 10 million vehicles. Memorandum from Joan Claybrook to
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation 1 (Oct. 3, 1980), reprinted in Joint Ap-
pendix at 293, CenterforAuto Safety. Regarding vehicles equipped with the remaining two
types, the Administrator intended to negotiate with Ford before making a final determina-
tion because the remedy was simpler and settlement was a possibility. Id. at 15, Joint
Appendix at 307. Neither the Secretary nor the Administrator had made a formal final
determination of defect when the case was settled. See infra notes 122-24 and accompany-
ing text.
119. Ford contended that no mechanized defect existed, that the transmission slippage
was caused by vehicle operators and occurred no more frequently in Ford cars than others,
and that the number of reported failures was exaggerated due to NHTSA's publicizing of
the cases. See Brief for Appellees at 9 and Joint Appendix at 138-82, Center for Auto
Safety.
120. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1983, at All, col. 1.
121. Ford had stated throughout the process that it would seek judicial review of a
recall order. During the administrative hearing, it had sought preenforcement judicial re-
view of the investigation. Its suit was dismissed by stipulation. Brief for Appellees at 9,
Center for Auto Safety.
122. NHTSA estimated that the enforcement action would take at least four years, dur-
ing which about six million of the defective vehicles would be retired from service. Brad-
ford Affidavit. supra note 91, at 335-36.
123. The amount of time devoted by NHTSA's engineering staff to this one case im-
paired investigations of other defects. In the six months before settlement, six members of
NHTSA's professional investigation staff worked full time and 10 spent 30% of their time
on the Ford investigation. Id. at 334. Another factor was that proof of a safety-related
defect was made difficult because drivers' actions were a key factor in the vehicle malfunc-
tions. Centerfor Auto Safety, 685 F.2d at 663. But see supra text accompanying notes 30-
33 (discussing Wheels). A defect may be found where significant failures occur in "normal
operations," a term that includes reasonably foreseeable operator misuse.
124. 685 F.2d at 661 nA.
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of the vehicles absent the Agency's final determination that the
defect related to motor vehicle safety. 25 The court also concluded
that the settlement was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion in light of the factors that led the Agency to settle the
case. 126
Considerable criticism has followed the settlement and
NHTSA's subsequent failure to monitor its effectiveness in
preventing further injuries.127 Consumer advocates have claimed
that since the settlement, transmission failures have caused over
fifty fatalities, but NHTSA has refused to reopen the case. 128
Although the Ford transmission case may be unique, 29 the
problems it typifies are not. The lengthy procedures of the auto
recall program frustrate the safety aims of the program when they
prevent the Agency from obtaining a recall. An expeditious alter-
native procedure is therefore needed in serious defect cases. A
provision granting NHTSA authority similar to the CPSC's "im-
minent hazards" authority 130-allowing the Agency to go directly
to federal district court for a recall order-would be useful.
Although this remedy probably would be used rarely, its availa-
bility could give the Agency an added advantage in the settlement
process, one lacking under the current procedural scheme.
5. Recall Effectiveness
The average owner response rate for auto recalls is higher than
that for other product recalls. '3' A primary reason is direct no-
tice-most car owners receive a letter notifying them of the re-
125. Id. at 662. The Agency had not made a final determination. See supra note 117.
126. 685 F.2d at 663.
127. Congressman Timothy Wirth called the dashboard sticker "gibberish." Wall St. J.,
June 16, 1983, at 23, col. 1. Whether NHTSA has monitored the settlement is disputed.
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1983, at A11, col. 1. According to former Administrator Peck, the
Agency did follow up on the fatalities reported after the settlement. Peck Interview, supra
note 53.
128. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59. Before the settlement, 98 deaths, 1,700 injuries,
and 6,000 accidents had been attributed to the Ford transmission defect. Wall St. J., June
16, 1983, at 23, col. 1. According to former NHTSA Administrator Peck, however, given
the low return rates for recalls, it is not at all clear that recall and mechanical correction of
the problem would have provided a more effective remedy than the warning sticker. Peck
Interview, supra note 53.
129. The estimated cost of the requested Ford transmission recall was $130 million.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1983, at All, col. 1. A recall order might have posed a serious threat
to the company's survival at the time. Wall St. J., June 16, 1983, at 1, col. 6. In addition,
the parties settled the case near the end of the Carter Administration, giving rise to specula-
tion that the policymakers wanted to secure some remedy in the case before leaving office.
130. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
131. While about 50% of car owners respond to recalls, see infra note 134 and accompa-
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call.' 32 Such notice is seldom possible in other product recalls
because individual owners cannot be identified. Another reason
for the higher response rate for autos is their expense. The auto-
mobile is a major investment for most owners, who have an inter-
est in its maintenance.133  Even so, the response rate for auto
recalls is still quite low. Over the years, the rate has averaged
about fifty percent, although an upswing has occurred in recent
years.' 34 Vehicle owners fail to respond for several reasons: inad-
equate notice, perception that the risk of injury is low, and the
inconvenience of taking a car in for repairs.
a. Lack of Notice. Owners state that lack of notice is a major
reason for not responding to recalls.' 35  One study showed that
nearly a quarter of those not responding claimed they had not
been notified.' 36  The authors of the study concluded that some
members of that group probably had received notice but had for-
gotten, especially if they had perceived the defect as trivial.' 37 In
addition, the study theorized that some may have used lack of no-
tice as a socially desirable excuse for not having responded to a
recall.' 38 Others obviously had not received notice due to difficul-
ties inherent in using the mail to reach every car owner. Manufac-
nying text, only about 10% of consumers respond to recalls under the CPSC's jurisdiction.
See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (Safety Act's notice requirements).
133. A CPSC study demonstrated that recalls of costly products are more likely to be
effective than recalls of less expensive items. See infra notes 283, 285.
134. GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 15. The overall average return rate be-
tween 1966 and 1979 was 53.5%. Id. The return rate in 1981 was 67.2% and the 1982 rate
is also expected to be well above average. Telephone interview with Bobby Boaz, NHTSA
Office of Public Affairs (Sept. 30, 1983).
135. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., STUDY TO DETERMINE WHY VEHICLE OWNERS RESPOND
TO OR IGNORE RECALL NOTIFICATIONS 24 (1980) (prepared by Market Facts, Inc. for
NHTSA) [hereinafter cited as DOT RECALL STUDY]. The targets of 25 recall campaigns in
1977 and 1978 comprised the sample for the study, during which the authors completed
over 6,000 interviews with responders and nonresponders.
136. Id. For some campaigns the figures were even higher-more than 50%--and in
one case up to 81% of the nonresponding owners claimed they had not received notice. Id.
at 23.
137. For example, in one recall involving merely the replacement of a label, 46.2% of
those who had returned their cars for service claimed not to have received a recall notice.
Id. at 20. Undoubtedly they had received the notice and forgotten.
138. Indirect evidence of this phenomenon is found in cases in which nonresponders
thought the defect was serious. Of this group, 24% claimed they had received no notice.
Only 8.8% of the nonresponders who thought the defect was trivial cited this excuse. Since
it is unlikely that actual receipt would depend on the seriousness of the defect, a plausible
explanation is that the nonresponders sought a socially acceptable justification for their
inaction.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
turers send notices based on state vehicle registration information
which is never completely up to date when the manufacturers ob-
tain it.' 39 In recalls of older cars, notification is especially difficult
because of the likelihood that the cars have changed owners.' 40
In any event, lack of notice is not always an important reason
for a low response rate. In the well-publicized Pinto recall, for
example, nearly half the owners did not respond' 4' and only 0.8%
gave lack of notice as their excuse. 42 A large percentage (22%)
failed to respond because of the time or inconvenience in-
volved. 143 Although a certain percentage of owners might ignore
a recall notice under almost any circumstances, the low response
rate nevertheless casts doubt on whether the notice does an ade-
quate job of informing owners of the risk.
b. Inadequate Notice. Current regulations carefully prescribe
the contents of recall letters,'" thereby eliminating NHTSA's
practice of allowing manufacturers to draft their own recall letters,
which sometimes included denials that a defect existed. 4' The
regulations cover all recall letters, whether NHTSA ordered or
manufacturer initiated. 46 The letter must describe the defect, 14
evaluate the risk, 148 specify measures for remedying the defect, 149
and state that owners may file a complaint with NHTSA if the
139. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59.
140. Id.
141. GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 44.
142. DOT RECALL STUDY, supra note 135, at 25. The Pinto recall was among those
examined in the study.
143. Id. Other reasons given for not responding were that the car was sold before the
recall (29.4%), the parts were not in stock or service was bad (7.6%), there was nothing
wrong with the car (1.7%), or the car already had been serviced (23.5%). Id.
144. See 49 C.F.R. § 577.1-.9 (1983).
145. Believing that the disclaimers would not "normally" affect owner response to re-
calls, NHTSA had allowed the practice to continue for a number of years. See 38 Fed.
Reg. 22,126 (1973). The Agency later reversed itself, finding that such disclaimers might
effectively discourage owner response. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,815 (1976); see also supra note 19
(providing example of effects of this practice).
146. 49 C.F.R. §§ 577.5(c), .6(a) (1983).
147. Id. § 577.5(e). The description must identify the vehicle system or item affected
and describe the potential malfunction, the conditions that may cause the malfunction, and
the precautions the owner should take before repair. Id.
148. Id. § 577.5(f). If a crash without warning is a risk, the letter must so state; if a
warning may occur before a crash the letter must describe it, along with an admonition that
failure to heed the warning may result in a crash. If the risk does not involve a crash, the
manufacturer must describe the type of injury that may result. Id.
149. Id. § 577.5(g)(1). The letter must indicate that the remedy will be provided with-
out charge, give the earliest date when repair or replacement will be available, describe the
necessary work, and estimate the amount of time required to correct the defect.
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defect is not corrected.15 0
Although the requirements for the recall letters are detailed
and exhaustive, they have not substantially increased owner re-
sponse rates. Indeed, a GAO study attributed some lack of re-
sponse to the style used in drafting recall letters.'" Not only do
manufacturers write the letters at reading levels too advanced for
most adults,5 2 but they also fail to highlight safety risks to im-
press the reader.' GAO concluded that owners fail to respond to
recalls because they underestimate the importance of having the
defect corrected.' 54  To remedy the inadequacy, GAO recom-
mended lowering the reading level of the letter, 5 5 highlighting the
safety consequences of the defect,'56 and mailing a postcard re-
minder shortly after the first recall letter is sent. 57 In response to
the first recommendation, NHTSA has begun making the letter
more understandable.' 58 This is a positive development which
should help increase response rates. The increase may not be
marked, however, because even when owners fully understand the
risks many do not return their vehicles for repair.151
c. Risk Perceptions. Many vehicle owners fail to perceive the
safety-related defect as serious or likely to injure them. Often this
perception is correct. Even NHTSA concedes that "relatively few
recalls in fact represent extremely grave or urgent elements of risk
150. Id. § 577.5(g)(1)(vii)(A), (B)(1). The letter must provide NHTSA's name and ad-
dress and indicate that the owner should file a complaint if the manufacturer did not cor-
rect the defect free of charge or within 60 days after the owner first tendered the vehicle for
repair.
151. See GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 16-24.
152. An analysis of 11 recall letters demonstrated that the letters were written at levels
requiring between 12.4 years of education (December of 12th grade) to 16.4 years (senior
year of college). About 54% of the adult population reads at or below the 11 th grade level.
Id. at 18.
153. Id. at 19. The information about safety consequences is buried in the last line of a
paragraph near the middle of the text.
154. Id. at 14.
155. Id. at 24. In the study, GAO converted a typical recall letter from 12th grade level
to 5th grade level, demonstrating that it could convey the same information more logically
and comprehensibly. Id. at 20-21.
156. The proposed recall letters would begin with a notice about how the safety defect
could cause the vehicle to fail and result in a crash. This notice would be printed in capital
letters and boxed for emphasis. Id. at 21.
157. The GAO based this recommendation on the successful use of follow-up postcards
to increase response rates in public opinion surveys. Id. at 14.
158. The Agency hired a private firm to write a readable letter, provoking criticism for
being unable to write one itself and for paying the firm approximately $23,000. See Why
Uncle Sam Can't Write, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1983, at A22, coL 1.
159. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing Pinto recall).
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or exposure."' ° Recalls for windshield wiper failures exemplify
the nonurgent case.' 6' Moreover, in some cases only a few of the
thousands of cars recalled actually contain a defect.' 61 Owners
who return their cars for repairs only to be told that no defect
exists may be less likely to respond to future recalls.' 63 Owners
who do not respond and never encounter the problem described in
the recall letter also may be less likely to respond to future recalls.
GAO's recommended approach to the risk perception problem
is increased emphasis in recall letters on the safety consequences
of the defect."'4 This approach, however, involves the risk of ex-
aggerating the danger and ultimately diminishing the overall im-
pact of recall letters. Another suggested approach is reducing the
number of recalls by raising the threshold of risk which warrants a
recall.' 65 Using the recall remedy to address only the most serious
defects would give individual recall campaigns more force. This
approach, however, deprives consumers of a benefit they currently
enjoy under the Safety Act-free repair of less serious safety-re-
lated defects.
A compromise approach is preserving the broad scope of
NHTSA's recall program while developing a recall classification
system to identify high-risk, imminent hazard recalls. This would
aid owners in assessing the danger of a defect. NHTSA would
thus follow the example of the FDA, which for years has classified
recalls by risk in order to communicate the seriousness of a prob-
lem to the public. ' 66 Although the classification system does have
drawbacks, especially during the recall negotiation phase, 167 if it
could improve response rates in serious defect cases (even if it re-
duced them in the less serious cases), it would be worth the
effort.' 68
Aside from the defect notification letter, NHTSA imposes no
160. GAO RECALL REPORT, supra note 27, at 43.
161. See DOT RECALL STUDY. supra note 135, at 20.
162. Peck Interview, supra note 53. Most autos are recalled for flawed or improperly
manufactured components, although some are recalled for defective designs as well. The
manufacturer may find the flaws in only a small number of the cars it recall, Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
165. See generally Note, supra note 8.
166. See infra notes 409-13 and accompanying text.
167. The FDA's classification system has inhibited settlement, and the Agency has con-
sidered abandoning it. See infra notes 448-51 and accompanying text.
168. The FDA has never evaluated its classification scheme. See infra note 453. Other
agencies need to test the system to determine whether its implementation would be practi-
cable and whether it would improve recall response rates in serious defect cases.
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obligation to improve owner response even when the response rate
is low and the risk high.169 Fortunately, manufacturers do take
extra steps to encourage owners to return their cars for repairs.
17 0
Nevertheless, NHTSA should experiment with other devices for
improving return rates in high-risk recalls. The Agency might
further publicize recalls where owner response has been low, or
require manufacturers to send follow-up mailgrams or pay for no-
tices sent by NHTSA.171 Notice from a government authority can
have extra clout with consumers, impressing upon them the im-
portance of responding to a recall. 172
Some owners will not respond to a recall even when the notice
is received, adequately informs the owner of the risk, and reveals
that the risk is high. 73 For these owners, little, if anything, can be
done short of an enforcement scheme penalizing the failure to re-
spond. Such a scheme is technically possible-for example, fed-
eral law could prohibit states from registering vehicles that have
been recalled but not repaired. 174  This scheme certainly would
improve recall response rates; it might be even more effective if
applied only to high-risk recalls so as not to burden the states
unduly.
169. NHTSA monitors all recalls but imposes no additional requirements on manufac-
turers when the return rate is low. In some cases, however, the Agency encourages manu-
facturers to mail out additional notices. Peck Interview, supra note 53.
170. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59. Concerns about product liability claims partially
motivate manufacturers to achieve high return rates. See GM RecallAdverlisement, supra
note 65 (GM goes beyond federal requirements by sending follow-up letters to owners not
responding to initial recall notice).
171. Ditlow Interview, supra note 59. NHTSA could also require manufacturers to
offer prospective used car buyers data on whether individual cars have been recalled and
repaired. This information is readily available to manufacturers. GM's Computerized Re-
call Identification System (CRIS), for example, can reveal instantly based on the vehicle
identification number whether recall work has been performed. GMRecallAdvertisement,
supra note 65. Publicizing the availability of this information might provide another in-
centive for owners to respond to recalls.
172. For example, the Attorney General of Indiana aids auto dealers in their recall
efforts by sending his own letter, which urges vehicle owners, "[P]rotect yourself and your
family by taking [your] vehicle to your dealer as soon as possible." The letter stresses that
failure to have the vehicle repaired "could have an effect on your auto liability insurance."
Since this assistance from the Attorney General's Office became available in January, 1982,
many dealers have utilized it and customer response rates have improved substantially.
Letter from Eric M. Cavanaugh, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, to Sam Zagoria,
Commissioner of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (Nov. 5, 1982) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
173. The Pinto recall best exemplifies this phenomenon. See supra notes 141-43 and
accompanying text.
174. Based on manufacturers' records kept according to vehicle identification numbers,
the state could determine whether a car had been repaired. Ditlow Interview, supra note
59.
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D. Recommendations
The auto recall program should continue to operate largely on
a voluntary basis. However, three statutory amendments would
help to reduce delays in the negotiation process, thereby enhanc-
ing recall effectiveness. The first is to add a provision similar to
that contained in the Consumer Product Safety Act, requiring
manufacturers to notify NHTSA of defects that could create
hazards. This provision would give the Agency early warning of a
problem and reduce its information-gathering burden. The sec-
ond is to revoke the eight-year statute of limitations on no-charge
repairs, which can encourage dilatory tactics in the investigation
of defects. The third is to add a provision granting NHTSA au-
thority to bypass the administrative hearing and seek court-or-
dered recalls in cases of serious, imminent hazard.
To increase recall effectiveness, NHTSA should improve its
notification letter and consider classifying recalls according to
risk, tailoring the recalls' requirements to meet that risk. This ap-
proach might help consumers more accurately assess the risks of
safety-related defects, without limiting NHTSA's use of the recall
remedy or the opportunity for no-cost repairs afforded under the
Safety Act.
II. THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
The CPSC is the newest and smallest of the three Agencies
with recall authority. Since its establishment in 1972, it has partic-
ipated in roughly 3,000 recalls involving approximately 300 mil-
lion product units. 175 These figures reflect the Agency's
175. TABLE I
FISCAL NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE
YEAR RECALLS* PRODUCTS RETURNED
INVOLVED
1982 91 2,570,117 17.4%
1981 40 2,475,455 25.6%
1980 132 23,310,834 15.6%
1979 198 53,555,927 8.3%
1978 128 35,112,116 16.6%
1977 89 27,281,798 4.2%
1976 162 12,289,631 15.5%
1975 124 12,186,228 25.4%
1974 145 12,205,799 18.9%
1973 3 49,999 99.8%
Total 1,112 181,137,904 12.5%**
* Under § 15(a)(2) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a)
(1982).
** Average percentage
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preference for the recall as an enforcement tool, as well as the
diversity and breadth of the Commission's jurisdiction.'76 Recalls
by the CPSC generally address many products, are undertaken
voluntarily by manufacturers, and yield low consumer return
rates.
A. Recall Authority
The CPSC enforces five federal statutes: the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act (CPSA),' 7 7 the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(FHSA),' 78 the Flammable Fabrics Act (FFA),79 the Poison Pre-
vention Packaging Act (PPPA),18 ° and the Refrigerator Safety Act
(RSA).' 8 1 The latter four are often referred to as the "transferred
acts" because other agencies had enforced them before creation of
the CPSC.
1. The Transferred Acts
Of the four transferred acts, only the FHSA contains specific
TABLE II
FISCAL NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE
YEAR RECALLS* PRODUCTS RETURNED
INVOLVED
1982 72 830,197 22.7%
1981 251 906,810 35.6%
1980 456 3,189,775 19.3%
1979 347 4,478,863 6.6%
1978 149 4,652,293 15.4%
1977 58 16,222,526 10.4%
1976 85 78,083,419 0.5%
1975 67 353,270 33.0%
1974 124 1,640,679 42.1%
1973 394 -- - -
Total 1,899 109,809,648 4.5%**
* Under CPSA, FHSA, and FFA regulations
Average percentage
The average return rate for all products is 9.8%. By excluding fiscal year 1976, an aberra-
tional year, the average rises to 13.1%. Interview with David Thome, Director of the Divi-
sion of Corrective Actions, Directorate for Compliance and Administrative Litigation,
CPSC, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Thome Interview].
176. Estimates of the number of products under the Agency's jurisdiction range from
10,000 to 15,000. H.R. REP. No. 114, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1983).
177. Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2051-2083 (1982)).
178. Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (1960) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-
1276 (1982)).
179. Ch. 164, 67 Stat. 111 (1953) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204
(1982)).
180. Pub. L. No. 90-601, 84 Stat. 1670 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1471-1474, 1476 (1982)).
181. Ch. 890, 70 Stat. 953 (1956) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1214 (1982)).
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recall authorization. 182 Until 1981, the Act included a rigid recall
provision mandating repurchase of every noncomplying product,
no matter how insignificant the hazard or degree of noncompli-
ance. 8 3  In 1981, Congress replaced the provision with one
modeled on the CPSA's recall requirements.
8 4
For a number of years, the Commission had maintained that
the FFA implicitly authorized recalls as part of the injunctive re-
lief available to restrain ongoing violations of the Act.'8 5 In Con-
goleum Industries, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled that absent specific authorization by the FFA, no recalls
could be ordered. 86 In the staffs view, however, section 15 of the
CPSA empowers the Commission to recall dangerously flamma-
ble products.'8 7
2. The CPSA
Congress enacted the CPSA in 1972, at the end of the "con-
sumer decade"-a decade marked by high expectations about the
government's ability to correct safety problems and passage of nu-
merous health and safety statutes. 188 The CPSA gave the Com-
mission enormously broad jurisdiction over consumer products
182. The CPSC's authority to recall under the RSA has never been tested because vir-
tually all refrigerator manufacturers have complied with the statute. Interview with Robert
Poth, Director of the Division of Regulatory Management, Bureau of Compliance, CPSC,
in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Poth Interview]. Likewise,
neither the PPPA, the FHSA nor the FFCA contains recall authority; however, CPSC staff
have argued that in an appropriate case involving a severe hazard, the Commission could
seek the recall of noncomplying PPPA packaging under § 15 of the CPSA since the pack-
aging would be a consumer product. The Commission has not yet attempted to use this
section because in the few instances where it might have applied, companies recalled vol-
untarily. Normally, however, the CPSC does not seek consumer-level recalls for noncom-
plying packaging under the PPPA. Interview with Michael Gidding, Staff Attorney for the
CPSC, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 10, 1983).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1274 (1982).
184. See Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 1211(f)(1), 95 Stat. 703, 721 (1981) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1274 (1982)). As amended.
the FHSA authorizes the recall of banned hazardous substances after a hearing similar to
that mandated by § 15 of the CPSA.
185. The FFA authorizes the CPSC to enjoin future violations by issuing cease and
desist orders under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1194 (1982).
186. 602 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1979).
187. Interview with Philip Bechtel, Director of the Division of Administrative Litiga-
tion, Directorate for Compliance and Administrative Litigation, CPSC, in Washington,
D.C. (June 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Bechtel Interview]. The staffs recall theory for
the FFA is the same as its theory for the PPPA. See supra note 182.
188. See Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the
Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 33-34, 42-45 (1982).
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and an equally broad range of enforcement tools, 89 including the
most expansive recall powers authorized at the federal level.
a. Imminent Hazards-Section 12. The CPSC may seek re-
call under two provisions of the CPSA. Under section 12, it can
proceed directly to federal district court in the case of an "immi-
nently hazardous" consumer product. 190 An imminently hazard-
ous product is one presenting an "imminent and unreasonable
risk of death, serious illness, or severe personal injury."'19 Since
its inception, the CPSC has filed only four imminent hazard ac-
tions. Three of the cases-which involved a "trouble light" posing
an electrocution hazard, 92 an amusement park ride with defective
door latches, 93 and an automatic pitching machine that activated
without warning even when turned off' 94-- were settled before fi-
nal court rulings. The fourth, involving aluminum wire, was dis-
missed on jurisdictional grounds after years of litigation and
appeals. 195
One writer, noting that courts have insisted on lengthy, full-
fledged evidentiary hearings in imminent hazard cases, has sug-
gested that section 12 is not the emergency procedure envisioned
by Congress. 196 However, this judgment is probably premature.
In three of the four cases, the Commission obtained either an im-
mediate temporary restraining order or an informal agreement by
the defendants to halt further distribution of the allegedly hazard-
ous products pending the outcome of the case. Moreover, the sat-
isfactory settlement of three of the four cases commends the
process, 197 suggesting that court action expedites settlement and
189. See id. at 43-44 (describing CPSC's administrative powers and authority to seek
various forms of judicial relief).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 2061 (1982). The Commission may bring an imminent hazard case in
its own name, and need not use Justice Department lawyers, who may lack knowledge
about the facts of a case or the applicable law.
191. Id. § 2061(a).
192. CPSC v. A-K Elec. Co., No. 74-1026 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 9, 1974).
193. CPSC v. Advance Mach. Co., No. 77-1323 (D.D.C. consent judgment May 8,
1978), discussedin PRODUCT HAZARDS: A CASE HISTORY GUIDEBOOK 93-97 (S. Coffin ed.
1981) [hereinafter cited as PRODUCT HAZARDS].
194. CPSC v. Chance Mfg. Co., 441 F. Supp. 228 (D.D.C. 1977) (consent decree signed
Nov. 30, 1978), discussed in PRODUCT HAZARDS, supra note 193, at 107-11.
195. CPSC v. Anaconda Co., 3 CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY GUIDE (CCH) 75,284
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 7, 1982). The court held that since branch circuit aluminum wiring systems
are not customarily sold or distributed to consumers as distinct articles of commerce, they
are not "consumer products" within the CPSA.
196. See Madden, Consumer Product Safety Act Section 15 Substantial Product
Hazards, in PRODUCT HAZARDS, supra note 193, at 5, 27.
197. Bechtel Interview, supra note 187.
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thereby produces the desired result-prompt recall of the
products.
b. Substantial Product Hazards-Section 15. The authority
most often used for recalls under the CPSA is section 15.198 The
provision has become the Commission's favorite enforcement
tool, its use far eclipsing the issuance of safety standards and
product bans.199 Section 15 authorizes the CPSC to seek recall of
"substantial product hazards," products that create a "substantial
risk of injury to the public" either because they fail to comply with
a consumer product safety rule or because they contain a
defect.2 °°
Congress offered scant guidance as to what constitutes a defect
under section 15 and no court has interpreted its meaning. In
1978, the Commission promulgated a detailed interpretive rule
codifying its view of the recall provision.20  The rule broadly de-
fines defect to include design deficiencies as well as product flaws
due to quality control problems.2 °2 It also provides examples of
defective products, including those that fail to perform as adver-
tised, those made dangerous by inadequate warnings about fore-
seeable product use and misuse, and those exhibiting a pattern of
failure even though the specific cause of the problem cannot be
pinpointed.203 The Commission indicated that it would determine
defectiveness under a balancing test, weighing the risk of injury
against such factors as the product's utility, necessity, and type of
risk presented.2°
Not every safety rule violation presents a "substantial product
hazard," nor does every defective product. To present a substan-
tial product hazard, the defect must create a "substantial risk of
198. 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1982).
199. See Schwartz, supra note 188, at 69.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1982). Although this provision limits recalls to products posing
substantial risks and thus precludes recalls for minor violations of consumer product safety
rules, the CPSC may seek a court order permitting it to seize offending goods or to prevent
their further manufacture or distribution. Id. § 2071. The Commission may also seek civil
penalties for knowing violations of consumer product safety rules. Id. § 2069. In the rare
case where the Commission proves a knowing and willful violation after notice of noncom-
pliance, criminal sanctions are available. Id. § 2070.
201. 16 C.F.R. § 1115 (1984).
202. Id. § 1115.4. For an example of a design defect case, see infra note 260 and ac-
companying text.
203. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1984). For an example of a case where a defect could not be
pinpointed, see infra note 259 and accompanying text.
204. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1984).
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injury to the public 205 because of the "pattern of the defect, the
number of defective products distributed in commerce, the sever-
ity of the risk, or otherwise."20 6 The Commission views these fac-
tors as disjunctive, only one need be demonstrated to prove a
substantial product hazard. Thus, a product presenting the risk of
minor injury with great frequency could pose a substantial prod-
uct hazard, as could a product presenting a severe but infrequent
hazard.20 7
B. Implementing the Recall Authority
1. Identifying Defects
The CPSC learns of potential hazards from many sources, in-
cluding agency inspections and accident investigations, news re-
ports, and complaints from consumers and manufacturers'
competitors.20 8 Its most important sources, however, are manu-
facturers of consumer products obliged to report hazards and po-
tential hazards under section 15(b) of the CPSA.209
The reporting obligation under section 15(b) is broader than
that under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.2"0
A company must report under the CPSA not only when it discov-
ers that a product presents a substantial product hazard, but also
when it obtains information that "reasonably supports the conclu-
sion" that a product defect "could create" a substantial product
205. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a)(2) (1982).
206. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1984). Under the interpretive rule, the "pattern of defect"
refers to the source of the defect, i.e., the design, construction, packaging, warnings, etc.,
and the conditions under which the defect manifests itself. Id. In the Commission's view,
the "number of products distributed in commerce" can be miniscule-even one defective
product-if injury is likely and/or serious. In judging the "severity of the risk," the Com-
mission considers the gravity and likelihood of injury, taking into account the number of
reported injuries, the intended or reasonably foreseeable use of the product, and the popu-
lation group exposed to the product (children, elderly, handicapped). Id.
207. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 258.
208. Memorandum from David Schmeltzer, Director of the Directorate for Compli-
ance and Administrative Litigation, CPSC, to Stuart Statler, Commissioner of the CPSC 2
(May 26, 1983) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Schmeltzer Memorandum]. A sizeable number of cases of noncompliance with agency
regulations begin with "trade complaints" from competitors. Poth Interview, supra note
182.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1982). Roughly 60% of CPSC-conducted recalls of defective
products (excluding those involving safety rule violations) result from § 15(b) reports.
Many of these reports are stimulated by the Commission's "pre-section 15(b)" letters,
which inform companies of injury or accident reports brought to the CPSC's attention.
Each letter reminds the company of its reporting obligations under the CPSA. Thome
Interview, supra note 175.
210. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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hazard.2 t' Failures to report can subject violators to civil fines up
to $500,000212 and possibly to criminal penalties.2" 3 While the
Commission has only infrequently imposed civil penalties,21 4 it
has used its civil penalty authority more than NHTSA has used
similar authority.2"5 The Commission has done so both to deter
reporting violations and in some cases to negotiate more effective
recalls.21 6
To stimulate reporting and provide guidance to those subject
to section 15(b), Congress and the Commission have identified
two situations that must be reported immediately2 17 -failure of a
product to comply with a consumer product safety standard or
211. Section 15(b) provides:
Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and
every distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information which
reasonably supports the conclusion that such product-
(1) fails to comply with an applicable product safety rule; or
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard de-
scribed in subsection (a)(2) of this section,
shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure to comply or of such
defect, unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has actual knowledge
that the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect or failure to
comply.
15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1982).
212. Failure to report is a prohibited act under § 2068(a)(4), for which civil penalties
can be imposed. Id. § 2069.
213. Criminal sanctions can be imposed only for knowing and willful violations after
notice of noncompliance. Id. § 2070. The Commission has yet to confront a case warrant-
ing action under this section.
214. As of mid- 1983, the Commission had obtained civil penalties from manufacturers
for failures to make timely reports in 14 cases. This number reflects the Commission's
general inclination not to pursue de minimis violations. See infra note 225 and accompa-
nying text. Most assessments have been above $70,000, with several over $300,000. Bech-
tel Interview, supra note 187.
215. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., In re Bassett Furniture Indus., CPSC No. 78-51 (hazard determination
Jan. 24, 1978); CPSC No. 78-81 (hazard determination May 3, 1978), discussed in PRODUCT
HAZARDS, supra note 193, at 134-39 (Commission negotiated very effective recall plan and
agreed to relatively small civil penalty as part of settlement); see also infra note 294 and
accompanying text.
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1982). The Commission defines "immediately" as within
24 hours of determining that a reporting obligation exists. While the obligation does not
arise when a company has only a vague hint that it may have a problem, it may arise
before a company has completed investigating the problem. According to the Commission:
[T]he 24-hour period begins when the subject firm has information which reason-
ably supports the conclusion that its consumer product fails to comply with an
applicable consumer product safety rule or contains a defect which could create a
substantial product hazard. Thus, a firm could report to the Commission before
the conclusion of a reasonably expeditious investigation and evaluation if the re-
portable information becomes known during the course of the investigation.
16 C.F.R. § 1115.14(e) (1984).
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ban218 and a product defect that has caused or could help cause
death or grievous bodily injury.2 t9 In addition, the Commission
has listed a number of circumstances that companies should study
and evaluate in determining whether they must report.22
Although the reporting requirement is broad, only a small
number of section 15(b) reports are submitted yearly. The
number of reports decreased in 1980, 1981, and 1982, but re-
bounded in fiscal 1983.221 The decline may reflect a general per-
ception by business that the severe budget and staff cuts following
the 1980 election had substantially reduced the CPSC's capacity to
enforce the statute, reducing the risk of not reporting.222 Other
factors also discourage reporting. These include the risk of ad-
verse publicity regarding even minor problems223 and the possibil-
ity that the Commission will view a defect that a firm believes not
to be hazardous as serious enough to warrant a recall, or deem a
report untimely and impose penalties.
218. A product's failure to comply with a regulation under one of the transferred acts
must be reported if it constitutes "a defect that could create a substantial product hazard"
under § 15(b). See id. § 1115.2(c).
219. Id. §§ 1115.12(a), (c). In the latter case, a company need not report if it deter-
mines that its investigation does not support the existence of a product defect which could
create a substantial product hazard.
220. Under the Commission's rule, companies should make further inquiries when in-
formation from the following sources suggests either noncompliance with a safety rule or
existence of a potential safety problem: (I) engineering, quality control or production data,
(2) safety-related production or design changes, (3) product liability suit(s), (4) independent
laboratory tests, (5) complaints from a consumer or consumer group, and (6) information
from the CPSC or another agency. Id. § 1115.12(e). The Commission takes the position
that investigations and evaluations generally should not exceed 10 days. Id. § 1115.14(d).
If a firm reasonably could conclude that it is obliged to report before the end of the 10-day
investigation and evaluation period, it must so report. See supra note 217.
221. The number of § 15(b) reports filed with the CPSC since its establishment is as
follows:
Year Number of Reports
1983 131
1982 96
1981 121
1980 147
1979 201
1978 118
1977 74
1976 99
1975 119
1974 120
1973 3
Bechtel Interview, supra note 187.
222. Id.
223. For years, companies had argued that adverse publicity presented an extremely
strong disincentive to § 15(b) reports and urged the Commission to keep all such reports
confidential. See 43 Fed. Reg. 34,995-96 (1978).
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CPSC officials have attempted to minimize these disincentives
by giving the benefit of the doubt to firms that report safety
problems promptly224 and by ignoring de minimis reporting viola-
tions.225 Moreover, the Commission has made clear that filing a
section 15(b) report is not an admission that a substantial product
hazard exists.2 26 Finally, Congress virtually eliminated the risk of
adverse publicity in 1981, by amending the CPSA to bar release of
information submitted under section 15(b) except in very limited
circumstances.227 Despite the paucity of reports filed with the
CPSC, section 15(b) has been useful, not only providing the Com-
mission with early information about potential problems, but also
giving it additional leverage in negotiating recalls when section
15(b) arguably has been violated.228
2. The Investigative Stage
The CPSC follows different investigative procedures for prod-
ucts violating safety rules than for those containing defects.
a. Products Violating Safety Rules. Since determining
whether a product violates a rule or ban is generally easy, the
Commission has delegated responsibility for these cases to its re-
gional offices. 229 The regional staff makes an initial investigation
and, if warranted, collects a sample and forwards it to headquar-
ters for testing. If testing confirms a violation, the regional office
sends the firm a "letter of advice" advising it of the violation and
224. Bechtel Interview, supra note 187.
225. For example, in In re McGraw-Edison, CPSC No. 77-26 (defect reported July 21,
1977), discussed in PRODUCT HAZARDS, supra note 193, at 82-83, the Commission did not
pursue the company for a possible eight-day reporting delay where the company, when
alerted by quality control, found a possible problem, immediately embargoed further pro-
duction, and fully investigated the problem. CPSC staff concluded that the evidence then
available to the company indicated the minor nature of the hazard. See supra note 214 and
accompanying text.
226. The Commission's reporting rule provides that companies need not admit and
may specifically deny that the information they report reveals a substantial product hazard
or noncompliance with a safety rule. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(a) (1984).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5) (1982). The CPSC may not release any information sub-
mitted to it under under § 15(b) unless: (1) it files a complaint against the reporting firm; (2)
it enters into a written remedial settlement agreement with the firm; (3) the firm agrees to
the release of the information; (4) the Commission has filed an imminent hazard case under
§ 12 of the CPSA; (5) it has reasonable cause to believe that the information concerns a
product in violation of § 19(a) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2067(a); or (6) the information is
revealed in the course of or concerning a judicial proceeding.
228. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
229. Schmeltzer Memorandum, supra note 208.
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requesting that it stop distributing the product.230 If the regional
office in conjunction with headquarters decides that a recall is ap-
propriate, it asks the firm to present a recall plan. Typically, com-
panies have ten days to respond to letters of advice.231  The
regional office monitors the corrective action plan until comple-
tion, at which time the regional compliance officer closes the case.
If the matter is of sufficient magnitude, approval from headquar-
ters may be required.232
b. Product Defects. Normally, greater judgment is required
to determine whether a defective product presents a substantial
hazard. Thus, the Commission's decisionmaking process for those
cases is more centralized. In a typical case, the CPSC assigns a
compliance officer at headquarters to investigate the suspect prod-
uct. If, after consulting with agency epidemiologists and engi-
neers, the officer determines that a substantial hazard may exist,
he sends a letter to the manufacturer (or importer) requesting in-
jury information, production figures, and other pertinent data. In
the alternative, the officer can assign an inspector to visit the firm
and gather this information.233
If the data reveal a substantial hazard, the officer recommends
that the Director of the Division of Corrective Actions make a
preliminary determination that the product presents a substantial
hazard. If the Director agrees, the compliance officer sends a
"case opening letter" to the manufacturer indicating the prelimi-
nary finding and requesting the firm to submit a proposed correc-
tive action plan.234
At this stage, the compliance officer, in consultation with the
Director of the Corrective Action Division, classifies the product
according to the CPSC's three-tiered hazard classification system.
This system, designed primarily for internal use,235 ranks products
as A, B, or C hazards based on severity and likelihood of in-
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. The CPSC devotes resources commensurate with risk in rule-violation cases, but
does not use the three-tiered system for hazards described infra notes 236-37 and accompa-
nying text. Thome Interview, supra note 175.
233. Schmeltzer Memorandum, supra note 208.
234. Id.
235. Generally, the Commission does not disseminate its product hazard ratings, either
to the companies involved or to the public. CPSC staff is reluctant to share its hazard
rating judgments because ratings change as information accrues and because firms that
know their products have received relatively low ratings might be reluctant to undertake
comprehensive recalls. Bechtel Interview, supra note 187.
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jury.2 36 The higher a product's hazard rating, the more likely it is
to receive the Commission's attention. As a policy matter, the
Commissioners are immediately notified of class A hazards and
continuously apprised of developments in those cases. In recalls
of products with high hazard ratings, the Commission is likely to
require individual notice to consumers, widespread publicity, ex-
plicit descriptions of the hazard in recall letters, and close agency
scrutiny of the company's progress in implementing the recall.237
Once the CPSC has approved a corrective action plan, a re-
gional office normally monitors it.238 Recommendations to close a
case must be approved by the Director of the Corrective Action
Division and reviewed by the Director of Compliance and the Ex-
ecutive Director.239 In class A recalls, the Commissioners must
approve the closing of the case.2 °
3. Administrative Hearing and Judicial Review
If a case cannot be settled, the Commission must adjudicate
the matter. Both the CPSA and the FHSA require a formal ad-
ministrative hearing to determine whether a recall is warranted.241
An administrative law judge presides, cross examination is per-
mitted, and the ruling may be appealed to the Commission.242
If, based on the hearing, the Commission finds a substantial
product hazard under the CPSA, or determines under the FHSA
236. Schematically, the CPSC classification may be depicted as follows:
Hazard Priority Classifcation
Hazard Priority Class Class A Class B Class C
1. Severity* SOG *GO 0Q0
2. Likelihood** *' • O Q GOO
* 0 - Death or grievous injury
Q - Serious injury or illness
O - Moderate injury or illness
** 0 - Very likely
- Likely
O - Not likely, but possible
Memorandum from David Thome, Acting Director of the Corrective Action Division, Di-
rectorate for Compliance and Administrative Litigation, CPSC, to the Commission, attach-
ment A at 4 (Jan. 6, 1981) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Thome Memorandum].
237. Id. attachment A at 4-6.
238. Schmeltzer Memorandum, supra note 208.
239. Id.
240. Thome Memorandum, supra note 236, attachment B at 3-4.
241. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(d) (1982) (CPSA); id. § 1274(b) (FHSA). The Commission may
seek recalls under the FHSA only for banned hazardous substances.
242. See generally CPSC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 C.F.R.
§ 1025 (1984). At one point, the Commission permitted commissioners to act as presiding
officers, but later forbade commissioners from engaging in this practice. See id. § 1025.3(i).
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that recall of a banned hazardous substance would be in the pub-
liec interest, it may order the respondent to provide notification of
the hazard and/or the recall. It may order various forms of notifi-
cation, including public notice, notice by mail to those in the dis-
tribution chain, and/or mailed notice to consumers.243 In contrast
to NHTSA, 44 the CPSC enjoys substantial flexibility as a result of
these notification provisions. Since the products under the
CPSC's jurisdiction are so diverse, no one method of notification
suits all recalls.
The CPSC also may fashion the recall remedy to fit the cir-
cumstances. While the respondent must repair, replace, or refund
the purchase price of the product, 245 it may elect any of the three,
provided the Commission approves its recall plan. 46 The Com-
mission has yet to order a recall in a case adjudicated under these
provisions. It dismissed a group of cases,247 and the handful of
others were settled during litigation. 48
Neither the CPSA nor the FHSA contains explicit provision
for judicial review of an agency recall order following an adminis-
trative hearing.2 4 9 Thus, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
governs and its "substantial evidence" standard of review should
apply.250 Jurisdiction is under the APA in federal district court
with review by a United States court of appeals. 25' Two levels of
judicial review seem unnecessary, given the formal adjudicative
hearing at the agency level. Further, this multilevel review is
likely to cause delay that can undermine the effectiveness of a re-
call. 52 Thus, Congress should amend the CPSA and the FHSA to
243. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c) (1982) (CPSA); id. § 1274(a) (FHSA). Direct consumer notifi-
cation goes to those known to have been sold or taken delivery of the product.
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 1413 (1982); supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing NHTSA notice regulations).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(d) (CPSA); id. § 1274(b) (FHSA).
246. Id. §§ 2064(c), 1274(b).
247. See cases cited infra note 257.
248. Bechtel Interview, supra note 187. The CPSC currently is litigating two substan-
tial product hazard cases. Id.
249. In the absence of appeal by the respondent, the Commission may sue in federal
district court seeking either civil penalties or criminal sanctions for noncompliance with a
final order. See 16 C.F.R. § 1025.57(c) (1984).
250. Judicial review likely would be in accordance with § 706(2)(E) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). Interview with Alan Schoem, Assistant
General Counsel of the CPSC, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 27, 1983).
251. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
252. Delay makes locating products and notifying owners more difficult. In general,
recall rates are lower for old products than for recently purchased products. See infra note
283 and accompanying text.
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provide for direct review of CPSC recall orders by a United States
court of appeals. This approach would assure fairness to the par-
ties and better serve the safety aims of these acts.
4. The Settlement Process
a. Background. Since its creation, the CPSC's use of recalls
as an enforcement tool has far exceeded the level anticipated by
Congress. 5 3 In its early years, for example, the CPSC was criti-
cized for failing to implement the standard-setting provisions of
the CPSA,z54 but its use of section 15 recalls was considered a
great "success story. z2 5  By the early 1980's, when rulemaking
had come into general disfavor, the CPSC touted its use of section
15 as an efficient and effective alternative to rulemaking.2 56
Over the years, the CPSC has broadly interpreted its authority
under section 15. In case after case, the Commission has obtained
recalls before a single injury has occurred.257 It also has obtained
recalls when the number of injuries is small but the type of poten-
tial injury is severe or widespread.2 58 Furthermore, the CPSC has
253. Most observers anticipated that the CPSC's activities would be concentrated on
standard setting--the "heart of the CPSA." Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the
Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 899, 906 (1973).
254. Schwartz, supra note 188, at 62, 71.
255. Regulatory Reform-Volume IV Consumer Product Safety Commission, National
Highway Traffic Safety Commission, Federal Trade Commission." Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976) (testimony of Richard 0. Simpson, former
Chairman, CPSC).
256. Consumer Product Safety Commission Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1981) (testimony of Susan King, former Chairman, CPSC).
257. See, e.g., In re Mylar Star Kites, CPSC No. 75-16 (Sept. 16, 1977), discussed in
PRODUCT HAZARDS, supra note 193, at 47. The case involved long-tailed aluminized poly-
ester kites that could cause (but had not) an electric shock to the user if it became entangled
in high-voltage power lines. The Commission ruled that the action should have been
brought under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act. Subsequently, it promulgated
under the FHSA a rule banning long-tailed aluminized polyester kites. See 16 C.F.R.
§ 1500.18(c)(1) (1984).
Other cases involving recalls but no reported injuries include In re Parkway Fab-
ricators, CPSC No. 78-41 (file opened Dec. 19, 1977) (defective scuba regulator that could
cut off diver's air supply); In re Nevco, Div. of U.S. Indus., CPSC No. 78-16 (file opened
Nov. 11, 1977) (hot pot for heating water that could cause electric shock due to corrosion of
wires in heating element); and In re Wham-O Mfg. Co., CPSC No. 77-1 (filed Mar. 11,
1977) (crossbow with defective latch that could release arrow unintentionally).
258. See, e.g., In re Hillerich & Bradsby Co., CPSC No. 75-9 (filed Nov. 5, 1975); In re
Pepsico, Inc. & Wilson Sporting Goods, CPSC No. 75-10 (filed Nov. 5, 1975); In re Lan-
nom Mfg., CPSC No. 75-I1 (filed Nov. 5, 1975); In re Reynolds Metals Co., CPSC No. 75-
12 (filed Nov. 5, 1975); In re Aluminum Co. of Am., CPSC No. 75-13 (filed Nov. 5, 1975);
In re Eaton Corp., CPSC No. 75-14 (filed Nov. 5, 1975). All six cases involved aluminum
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obtained recalls when neither it nor the manufacturer could
pinpoint the injury-causing product defect.259 Finally, the Com-
mission has claimed that industry-wide design defects can present
a substantial product hazard warranting industry-wide recall.2 61
Responding to contentions that it has used section 15 improperly
as a "standard-setting" tool in such cases,26' the Commission ar-
gues that it is within its discretion to proceed by adjudication.262
Most courts would agree that an agency has such discretion.263
b. Inducements to Settlement. All recall programs entail sim-
ilar inducements to settlement. Like NHTSA, the CPSC wants a
prompt recall agreement so that consumer response is maxi-
mized.2" Because of difficulties in recalling products at the con-
sumer level, this incentive is particularly strong for the CPSC.265
Moreover, the Commission wants to avoid litigation to conserve
agency resources. Since the CPSC is a small agency with a limited
bats with rubber grips that could deteriorate and detach, possibly causing the bat to fly
from the swinging batter's hand. Two injuries and one death from roughly 4.8 million bats
had been reported when the recalls were undertaken.
259. In re North Am. Sys., CPSC No. 77-19 (file opened Jan. 24, 1977). Neither the
CPSC nor the company could pinpoint the cause of several fires and mechanical failures in
automatic drip coffeemakers. Due to the vast number of complaints, the CPSC neverthe-
less insisted that the company recall the product and redesign it to minimize future
problems. In targeting those coffeemakers to be recalled, the parties relied on the pattern
of complaints filed with the company to estimate the period during which the bulk of de-
fective items were produced.
260. For example, during 1981 CPSC staff wrote to every known manufacturer of elec-
tric clamp lamps, informing them of its conclusion that lamps without certain safety fea-
tures constituted a substantial product hazard. Although the Commission's action
prompted a horde of angry protests, most manufacturers agreed to redesign their lamps.
261. See Letter from James N. Pearse, Group Vice President of Engineering of Leviton
Manufacturing Co., to Linda Glatz, Division of Corrective Actions of the CPSC (June 8,
1981) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review). Mr. Pearse wrote, "We believe
it is inappropriate for the Commission to threaten Section 15 action on the basis of not
complying with a generic, design standard imposed by the staff without complying with
traditional notice and comment procedures and without reviewing any substantive facts
concerning a manufacturer's particular product." Id. at 2.
262. The issue is currently being litigated in a CPSC action against manufacturers of
mesh-sided cribs. See infra note 300; see also R. David Pittle, Standards-Setting: Section
15 v. Section 7. Remarks at the Seminar on the Federal Regulatory Process (sponsored by
Law and Business. Inc.), in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 10, 1981).
263. Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1941); Saavedra v. Donovan, 700 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
236 (1983); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1329 (9th Cir. 1982). But f.
Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1983).
264. Delays reduce response rates under the recall programs of both agencies. See
supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (NHTSA); infra notes 283-86 and accompanying
text (CPSC).
265. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
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budget to carry out its very broad mandate,266 this incentive may
be even more compelling for the CPSC than for NHTSA.
Recall incentives for consumer product manufacturers are the
same as those for auto makers. To avoid litigation, consumer
product firms have agreed to recalls even though they did not be-
lieve their products created a substantial hazard.267 The threat of
product liability suits prompts them to avoid the formal agency
finding of "substantial product hazard" that may be admissible in
such suits. 268 Negotiated corrective actions are not equivalent to
an admission that a defect or hazard exists.269 Further, the cost
and delay of defending a lawsuit can be very high. Most compa-
nies faced with the uncertainty of litigation and the opportunity to
negotiate the terms of a voluntary recall opt for the latter ap-
proach.27 ° Companies also are induced to recall promptly to
avoid negative publicity that can stigmatize not only the recalled
product, but also the company's entire product line.2 7 ' Finally,
the wide range of enforcement tools available to the Commission
may have an important impact on the settlement process. Two of
the tools-section 12 actions for imminent hazards and civil pen-
alties for reporting violations272 -have been used infrequently,
but their availability may give the Commission extra clout in ne-
gotiating effective recalls.
These inducements have resulted in even less recall litigation
266. The CPSC is the smallest of the health and safety agencies and has only a fraction
of most agencies' budgets. See Schwartz, supra note 188, at 44 n.81. Nevertheless, Con-
gress has charged the CPSC with the major responsibility of "[protecting] the public
against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products." 15 U.S.C.
§ 2051(b)(1) (1982).
267. For example, to avoid litigation Sears agreed to recall seven-year-old fans that
overheated, although it did not believe the fans posed a substantial hazard. Hollerman &
Couric, Consumer Agencies Fretting About Poor Product Recalls, Legal Times of Wash.,
Mar. 3, 1980, at 1.
268. Madden, supra note 196, at 22.
269. In any subsequent litigation, companies can claim that they recalled a product out
of an abundance of caution and not because it posed a serious hazard.
270. For example, in the Sears recall of overheating fans, supra note 267, Sears was
able to negotiate a recall by advertisement rather than notice sent to credit card customers
with monthly bills. Hollerman & Couric, supra note 267, at 1.
Although the CPSC's recall provision has not been judicially interpreted, NHTSA's
requirement, which resembles the CPSC's, has been very broadly interpreted. See supra
notes 30-47 and accompanying text. This also may discourage legal challenges by
manufacturers.
271. Madden, supra note 196, at 22.
272. See supra notes 190-95, 214, 216 and accompanying text.
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at the CPSC than at NHTSA.273 In a 1980 report, a Commission
task force on recalls was critical of this reliance on negotiated set-
tlements.274 It recommended that the Commission bring more test
cases "to push recall authority to its limits of creativity and effec-
tiveness," and that it step up litigation "to make clear that it will
seek formal remedies if negotiations break down .... -275 The
first recommendation seems misplaced, since the Commission al-
ready enjoys expansive recall authority.276 The second recom-
mendation has more merit277-- there is some indication of a
general correlation between an agency's willingness to take en-
forcement actions and the amount of voluntary cooperation an
agency receives from the private sector.
278
5. Recall Effectiveness
The average response rate for recalls at the CPSC has been
about thirteen percent.2 79 Return rates vary markedly from recall
to recall, however, depending on a wide range of variables. 28 ° A
1978 Commission study found the most significant variables to be:
(1) the price of the product, (2) the expected useful life of the
product, (3) the number of units in distribution, (4) the age of the
product, (5) the type of corrective action-repair or re-
273. The CPSC has never issued a recall order following an administrative hearing.
See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
274. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, Report of the Recall Effectiveness Task Force 3
(Aug. 25, 1980) (available from the Office of the Secretary of the CPSC) [hereinafter cited
as Task Force Report].
275. Id.
276. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text for a sampling of defective prod-
ucts recalled at the CPSC's urging. In fact, the Commission never adopted this recommen-
dation. See Consumer Product Safety Commission Reauthorization: Hearings Before the
Subcom. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 336 (1981) (statement of Stuart Statler, acting Chairman of the
CPSC).
277. CPSC staff opinion is split on whether the Commission has been sufficiently ag-
gressive in its recall program. The current compliance director, although generally satisfied
with the CPSC's program, believes that the Agency must be prepared to litigate more
quickly when hazards are life-threatening. Moreover, while recognizing that some firms
will not agree to corrective action programs until their liability for timeliness violations has
been resolved, he is reluctant to trade reduced civil penalties for corrective action agree-
ments. Interview with David Schlmeltzer, Associate Executive Director for Compliance
and Administrative Litigation, CPSC, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 10, 1983).
278. In 1981, the number of voluntary recalls under the FDA's program dropped
sharply when the number of enforcement actions did the same. See infra notes 440, 441
and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 276.
280. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, Office of Strategic Planning, Recall Effectiveness
Study 6 (May 1978).
1984]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
fund-offered by the manufacturer, and (6) the level of direct
consumer notification.281 The study was unable to correlate recall
effectiveness with another variable that common sense might sug-
gest is important: the severity of the hazard.282
The study concluded that recalls are least effective when the
product costs under two dollars, its useful life is less than two
years, the number of recalled units exceeds 100,000, or the product
has been in distribution for over five years.2 83 It indicated that
recalls which entail direct consumer notice are generally effective,
and that the most effective recalls involve repairs made in con-
sumers' homes.284 Recalls with limited or no direct notification
are normally less than twenty percent effective, unless the recall
involves a very expensive unit or is geographically limited.285 Fi-
nally, recalls of products still in the distribution chain are far more
effective than recalls of products in consumers' hands.286
Several of the most important variables determining recall ef-
fectiveness are beyond the Commission's control-the price of a
product, its useful life, and the number of products distributed.
However, the Commission has some influence over other vari-
ables. Product age and the percentage of units in consumers'
hands can be controlled by negotiating a prompt and effective re-
call.287 The Commission has considerable control over the vari-
ables of notice and type of corrective action.
a. Notice. Notice is a critical issue for the CPSC and manu-
facturers alike. The Commission generally seeks to have recall
notices drafted in stark, direct, and dramatic terms and dissemi-
nated widely. Manufacturers fear that unduly strong notices will
cause consumers to overreact and discourage future sales. Thus,
much of the controversy in recall negotiation centers on notice.288
For some consumer products, especially durable goods, notice
281. Id.
282. The data showed that median case effectiveness remained similar at all hazard
severity levels. The most likely explanation is that consumers' risk perceptions did not
coincide with the CPSC's. Id. at 20.
283. Id. at 3.
284. Id. In cases of home repairs, 90% of the units will be repaired.
285. Id.
286. Task Force Report, supra note 274, at 19.
287. The recall must occur before the product is distributed widely to consumers. Id.
288. For example, in the Sears recall, see supra note 270, the CPSC wanted recall no-
tices sent to credit card holders along with monthly bills. Sears successfully resisted, argu-
ing that the notices would undermine other bill-stuffer advertisements. See Hollerman &
Couric, supra note 267, at 1.
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can be mailed to consumers who have returned warranty cards,
but many consumers fail to return them.289 For products whose
purchasers cannot be identified, notice of the recall must be di-
rected to the general public with the hope that the purchasers will
see it.
The Commission has been innovative in its approach to notice.
Early in its existence, the Commission sought a court order requir-
ing paid advertising to notify the public in an imminent hazard
case.2 90 Although the district court refused because, in its view,
sufficient publicity had been generated,2 91 the CPSC subsequently
obtained paid advertising agreements in numerous recalls. 292
Gradually, however, the Commission discovered that general me-
dia notice often costs more and produces less effective results than
"targeted" media notice. The Commission has thus sought notice
in diving magazines for allegedly defective scuba gear and gar-
dening magazines for an allegedly dangerous rototiller.293 In
cases involving severe risks, the Commission has obtained multi-
ple forms of targeted notice. For instance, the manufacturer of
two crib models alleged to present a strangulation hazard agreed
to place warnings in magazines directed to parents of newborns, to
mail notice to every United States household known to have chil-
dren up to the age of twenty-one months, and to mail warning
posters to all known pediatric clinics and maternity wards in the
country.294 As a result, recall rates improved significantly. 95
The CPSC has developed other techniques to alert the public
to product hazards. One is the use of bounties or rewards to moti-
vate consumers, as well as distributors and dealers, to participate
in the recall. For example, in the recall of an allegedly defective
smoke alarm that had been factory-installed in mobile homes, the
manufacturer offered mobile home park owners three dollars for
289. To counter this failing, one manufacturer rewards consumers for returning war-
ranty cards. Letter from Robert I. Yeoman, Vice President of Worthington Industries, Inc.,
to Sam Zagoria, Commissioner of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (October 25,
1979).
290. See CPSC v. A-K Elec. Co., No. 74-1026 (D.D.C. ified Sept. 9, 1974).
291. Id.
292. For a listing of cases, see PRODUCT HAZARDs, supra note 193, at 271.
293. In re Roper Corp. & Sears, Roebuck & Co., CPSC No. 82-1 (file opened Feb. 24,
1982) (rototiller); In re Parkway Fabricators, CPSC No. 78-41 (file opened Dec. 19, 1977)
(scuba gear).
294. In re Bassett Furniture Indus., CPSC No. 78-51 (file opened Jan. 24, 1978); CPSC
No. 78-81 (file opened May 3, 1978). The Commission accepted a comprehensive consent
order against the company. See id., CPSC No. 80-CO-002 (Feb. 7, 1980).
295. The response rates in the two recalls ranged from 24% to 45% and from 77% to
86%. PRODUCT HAZARDS, supra note 193, at 139.
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every alarm returned.296 A lawn and garden tractor manufacturer
offered an "early completion allowance" to dealers who found
and corrected allegedly defective products in inventory.297 Simi-
larly, the manufacturer of allegedly defective thermostats for gas
water heaters offered dealer's bonuses both for locating and for
replacing the thermostats.298  In the mesh-sided crib case, the
manufacturer offered a reward to anyone identifying an unmodi-
fied crib.299
The press conference is another form of notice used by the
CPSC, albeit infrequently. Such publicity enables the Commis-
sion to illustrate visually the hazard potential of a product, and
indicates strong agency concern regarding the danger.3° In sev-
eral instances, the Commission has determined to hold a confer-
ence whether or not the company agrees. This right was
recognized in a case involving an imminent hazard.3°'
b. Consumer Resistance. Consumers do not always respond
to recalls. In a survey of hairdryer owners following a highly pub-
licized recall of hairdryers containing asbestos, CPSC staff found
that while eighty-five percent of the owners were aware of the re-
call, only one-third of those whose hairdryers contained asbestos
stopped using them. Of the latter group, only four and one-half
percent took advantage of the repair, refund, or replacement rem-
edy offered by the manufacturers. °2 Of those consumers sur-
veyed who believed asbestos presented a serious or somewhat
serious problem, only slightly more than half (53.6%) had at-
tempted to determine whether their hairdryers contained the sub-
296. In re BRK Elec., CPSC No. 76-155 (file opened Aug. 24, 1976).
297. In re International Harvester, CPSC No. 77-40 (file opened May 2, 1977).
298. In re Emerson Elec., CPSC No. 80-66 (fie opened Mar. 7, 1980).
299. In re Bassett Furniture Indus., CPSC No. 78-51 (file opened Jan. 24, 1978); CPSC
No. 78-81 (fie opened May 3, 1978).
300. CPSC staff held a press conference to announce its view that manufacturers of
mesh-sided cribs had not warned sufficiently about the dangers of suffocation if a side is
left down and the child rolls between the mattress and the loose mesh side. Wash. Post,
Oct. 15, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
301. Subsequent to filing a complaint in the automatic pitching machine case, see supra
note 193, the Commission indicated that it planned to hold a press conference warning of
the machine's hazards. The manufacturer objected that a press conference during the pen-
dency of litigation was unfair. In a bench ruling, District Court Judge Thomas Flannery
refused to bar the press conference, indicating lack of judicial authority. Interview with
Catherine Cook, former Director of the Division of Administrative Litigation, CPSC, in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 16, 1983).
302. Task Force Report, supra note 274, at 20-28. The survey sample consisted of 600
nationwide telephone calls.
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stance.3 °3 Thus, as in the case of auto recalls, a certain level of
"recall resistance'3°4 cannot be overcome, despite the best efforts
of the Commission and manufacturers to publicize a problem and
provide generous relief. Some consumers may believe that the in-
jury associated with the recall will not happen to them. Others
may have adopted a fatalistic attitude, having become "saturated"
with news of hazards.30
5
C. Recommendations
Few changes in the CPSC's broad recall authority are neces-
sary to make it work more efficiently and expeditiously. However,
some modifications in the transferred acts and minor revisions in
the CPSA would be beneficial. In addition, the Commission
should consider at least one change in its own procedures. First,
the Commission should be granted specific recall authority under
the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the Flammable Fabrics
Act, and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act similar to that
under the CPSA.306 This would promote uniformity and reduce
delay by enabling the Commission to address the risks posed by
all products within its jurisdiction under its section 15 authority.
Second, Congress should correct the absence of a judicial review
provision for recall orders under the CPSA and FHSA. It should
provide for judicial review in United States courts of appeals
under the "substantial evidence" test, thereby eliminating the du-
plicative, two-tiered review procedure. Third, as a means of im-
proving consumer response to serious hazard recalls, the CPSC
should consider publicly classifying its recalls according to risk,
either by employing its internal classification system or by devis-
ing a simpler, perhaps two-tiered system. This approach would
enable the Commission to inform consumers of the relative risk of
recalled products, thus helping them to make more informed deci-
sions on how to respond to recalls.
303. Those who perceived the risk as serious were, however, far more inclined to deter-
mine if their hairdryers contained asbestos, and to discard them or seek corrective action if
they did. Id. at 22.
304. See Recall. Why So Many Are Flops, 34 CHANGING TIMES 29, 32 (Oct. 1980).
305. See The Ialure ofProduct Recalls, 46 CONSUMER REP. 45 (1971); Adequate No-
tice, But Not Many Returns, 13 QUALITY PROGRESS 11 (1980); Product Recalls, How Many
Listen?, Louisville Times, Sept. 2, 1982, at BI, col. 1.
306. 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a) (1982). To conduct recalls under the transferred acts, the
Commission must promulgate a rule under § 30(d) of the CPSA, id. § 2097(d), reflecting
its determination that the risk should be addressed under the CPSA. It then may initiate
an action for a recall in accordance with § 15 of the CPSA. See supra notes 190, 195 and
accompanying text.
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III. THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
The FDA, a part of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), has been involved in product recalls longer than
any other federal agency, and boasts perhaps the most elaborate
recall program. Each year, it conducts many hundreds of recalls
of products within its jurisdiction.307 Ironically, the FDA lacks
statutory authority to order most of these recalls. It relies largely
on voluntary recalls by manufacturers, sometimes using its au-
thorized enforcement mechanisms, such as seizures, to encourage
recalls.30 8 The recall has become one of the FDA's major tools for
enforcing the statutes it is charged with administering.0 9
A. Recall Authority. Background
Although FDA product recalls date back to the 1930's,310 the
Agency did not encourage voluntary recalls as part of its law en-
forcement program until the 1950's.31 1 Initially, manufacturers
only recalled products posing serious hazards. Later, they began
recalling products that posed less serious risks, and eventually
those that posed no risk at all but were in violation of the stat-
ute.312 Recalls burgeoned from fewer than 100 per year in the
early 1960's to over 1,000 recalls per year by the end of that
decade.313
In the early 1970's, Congress criticized the FDA for its failure
to establish guidelines or procedures to govern what had become
an enormous yearly volume of recalls.314 In the late 1970's, the
FDA instituted procedural guidelines. 315 Congress also consid-
307. Off. of Pub. Affairs, Food & Drug Admin., Talk Paper 2 (Dec. 6, 1982) (data
collected by FDA's Emergency and Epidemiological Operations Branch for fiscal years
1977 to 1982).
308. See infra notes 427-30 and accompanying text.
309. H.R. REP. No. 585, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE RE-
CALL REPORT]. In 1945, the FDA had relied mostly on seizures-over 3,000 a year--to
enforce its statute; by 1969 the yearly number of seizures had fallen to 383, and the agency
was relying largely on the recall remedy. Id. at 3, 8.
310. One of the earliest recalls, involving "elixir sulfanilamide," occurred in 1937. The
drug contained poison and had caused over a hundred deaths. The tragedy led to the 1938
amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, requiring that manufacturers prove
their drugs are safe before marketing them. Levy, supra note I, at 117-18.
311. HousE RECALL REPORT, supra note 309, at 3.
312. Id.
313. Id. From January 1962 to June 30, 1964, the FDA participated in only 43 recalls,
compared with 1400 in 1970.
314. Id. at 17, 20. The FDA also was criticized for overusing the recall tool and
neglecting its statutory sanctions such as seizures and injunctions.
315. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (1984).
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ered but never enacted legislation granting the FDA broad recall
authority.3 16 Instead, Congress has addressed the issue on a piece-
meal basis, giving the FDA limited recall authority under three
different statutes enacted between 1968 and 1976.
B. Statutory Authority
1. The Radiation Controlfor Health and Safety Act
a. Scope of Authority. The broadest recall provision is con-
tained in the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act
(RCHSA).31 7 It authorizes recall of radiation-emitting products
which "fail to comply with an applicable standard... [promul-
gated under the Act or] have a defect which relates to the safety of
use of such product. ... "3I8 Under the FDA's interpretation,
defective products are those that create a risk of injury, including
genetic injury, when the emissions are unintended or unnecessary,
or fail to meet the manufacturer's own emission standards. 9
b. Implementing Procedures. The RCHSA's broad reporting
requirement obligates manufacturers to inform the Secretary im-
mediately upon discovering a defect or failure to comply with a
standard.320 The FDA may also uncover defects or noncompli-
ance through its own inspections or testing.32' If, after studying
the problem, the FDA finds the product to be defective or not in
compliance, it notifies the manufacturer and gives it an opportu-
nity to contest the finding.32 2 The manufacturer may obtain an
informal administrative hearing on request.323 In the case of non-
316. See H.R. 5170, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 7407-09 (1975) (statement of
Rep. Koch).
317. 42 U.S.C. §§ 263b-263n (1982).
318. Id. § 263g.
319. 21 C.F.R. § 1003.21 (1984).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 263g(a)(1) (1982). Manufacturers also must submit copies of service
bulletins to the Secretary. Id. § 263g(d). This requirement resembles that imposed by
NHTSA. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. When the manufacturer notifies the
FDA, simultaneously it may seek an exemption from the notice requirements. 42 U.S.C.
§ 263g(a)(2) (1982). To obtain an exemption the manufacturer must show that the product
does not create a significant risk of injury. Id.
321. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL pt. 5, at 2
(1982) [hereinafter cited as FDA MANUAL].
322. 42 U.S.C. § 263g(e) (1982). The FDA must supply the manufacturer with its find-
ings and the data on which they are based. Id. In cases involving a defective product, a
health hazard evaluation committee assesses the significance of the public health hazard; in
cases involving violation of a standard, the health hazard is presumed. FDA MANUAL,
supra note 321, pt. 5, at 2.
323. Interview with Thomas Moore, Special Assistant to the Director of Compliance
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compliance, the manufacturer must rebut the presumption that
deviation from a standard presents a significant risk.32 4 The FDA
has the burden of proof in cases of alleged defects.32 5 Since enact-
ment of the RCHSA, only one administrative hearing has been
requested and held.326
When recall is required, the manufacturer must notify its deal-
ers, distributors, and consumer purchasers and their transferees
who are known or identifiable through reasonable inquiry.3 27
Under the Act, the manufacturer must remedy the problem at no
cost by repair, replacement, or refund.328 The FDA permits the
manufacturer to design its own corrective action plan, subject to
FDA approval.329 The implementing regulations detail the con-
tents of the notification letter330 and specify a warning to appear
on the mailing envelope. 331
If the manufacturer fails to implement an FDA-ordered recall,
the government may sue in federal district court to restrain the
manufacturer's violation of the order.331 As in the case of auto
recalls, trial is de novo, with the burden on the government to
establish that the product is defective.333 The court may likewise
Operations of the National Center for Devices and Radiological Health, FDA, in Silver
Spring, Md. (Nov. 6, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Moore Interview].
324. Id. Since the FDA had found the safety risk to exist during proceedings to estab-
lish the standard, noncompliance with the standard is presumed to create a risk unless the
manufacturer can show otherwise under the circumstances.
325. Id.
326. Id. The case involved microwave ovens manufactured by General Electric. GE
contested the FDA's measurement of microwave emissions, but ultimately agreed to recall
the ovens. Id.
327. 42 U.S.C. § 263g(a)(l), (b) (1982) (implementing regulations at 21 C.F.R.
§ 1003.10(b) (1984)). The manufacturer must notify the consumer by certified mail. 21
C.F.R. § 1003.21(c) (1984).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 263g(f) (1982) (implementing regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 1004.1(a)
(1984)).
329. Id. § 263g(f) (implementing regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 1004.1(b) (1984)); see also
FDA MANUAL, supra note 321, pt. 5, at 3.
330. The letter must identify the product, describe the problem, provide an evaluation
of the hazard in clear, nontechnical terms, and include prescribed language that the remedy
will be without charge. See 21 C.F.R. § 1003.21(a) (1984).
331. The envelope must bear the legend "IMPORTANT-ELECTRONIC PRODUCT RADIA-
TION WARNING." The regulation also specifies the size, print, and location of the legend.
Id. § I003.21(b).
332. 42 U.S.C. § 263j(a)(2) prohibits the failure to furnish defect notifications or pro-
vide repair, refund, or replacement of noncomplying or defective products. The federal
district courts have jurisdiction to restrain such prohibited acts. Id. § 263k(a).
333. Both the RCHSA and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act grant
jurisdiction to the district courts "for cause shown" to restrain statutory violations. See 15
U.S.C. § 1399(a) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 263k(a) (1982);see also supra text accompanying notes
83-84.
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impose civil penalties for failure to carry out the recall.334
The FDA's recall program, like those of NHTSA and the
CPSC, operates almost entirely on a voluntary basis. 335 This is
due not only to broad statutory recall standards, which the other
agencies share, but also to the fact that the FDA has promulgated
performance standards for every major category of radiation-
emitting products, thereby easing identification and proof of recall
cases.336  Moreover, the FDA has readily taken these cases to
court, seeking recalls and penalties when negotiation has failed.337
In every case, the parties reached a recall agreement before
trial.338
2. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
a. Scope of Authority. The Medical Device Amendments339
contain a recall provision that is narrower than that of the
RCHSA. It does not require repair, replacement, or refund in
every case and mandates notification only when a device presents
an "unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health" 340
and "no more practicable means is available" under the statute to
minimize the risk.34' Before the FDA may require notification, it
must consult informally with the obligated party.342 The Agency
may require that notice be given to health professionals who use
or prescribe the device, distributors and sellers of the device, and
device users (unless notice poses greater danger to the individual
334. A penalty of$I,000 for each product involved in the violation may be assessed, up
to a maximum of $300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 263k(b)(1) (1982). Similar civil penalty authority
should be provided under the other FDA-administered statutes. See infra note 436 and
accompanying text.
335. Moore Interview, supra note 323. The FDA's nine performance standards cover
such products as televisions, diagnostic X-ray machines, microwaves, and sunlamps. Id.
336. Id. Since the burden in noncompliance cases shifts to the manufacturer to show
absence of a health risk, the FDA's job is simplified in such cases. See supra note 324 and
accompanying text.
337. Moore Interview, supra note 323. Approximately 20 complaints have been filed
under the RCHSA. Id.
338. Id. The parties have settled during discovery, obviating a court-ordered penalty
or recall under the Act.
339. Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 539, 540 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360c
(1982)). Devices are to be classified by risk into three categories and regulated accordingly.
Class III devices present the greatest risk and require premarketing approval. Id.
§ 360c(a)(I)(C). Class II devices require performance standards to assure their safety and
effectiveness. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B). Class I devices involve the least risk and require only
general controls to prohibit misbranding and adulteration. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
340. Id. § 360h(a)(l).
341. Id. § 360h(a)(2).
342. Id.
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than no notice).3 43
The FDA also may order the manufacturer to repair, replace,
or refund the price of defective devices.31 It may do so only if
after providing for an informal hearing it finds that: (1) the device
presents an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public
health; (2) the device was improperly made "with reference to the
state of the art" at the time of manufacture; (3) the unreasonable
risk is not created by the user; and (4) notification alone is insuffi-
cient to eliminate the risk.345 Since these findings are difficult to
make in some cases, the Amendments thus substantially limit the
Agency's recall authority. For example, devices that complied
with the state of the art when made but subsequently are found to
be dangerous are not subject to recall.346 Improper use, the source
of many device failures, also prevents the FDA from pursuing the
full recall remedy.347
b. Finding the Defects. The Medical Device Amendments re-
quire that manufacturers report product defects to the FDA.348
Nevertheless, for years after their passage, the Agency failed to
propose regulations to implement this requirement.349 The FDA
has been criticized for this delay and for long relying on an inade-
quate system of voluntary reporting supplemented by agency in-
spection of manufacturers' complaint files.35° Predictably, the
343. Id. When notification might be harmful to the user (for example, in cases of de-
fective pacemakers), the notification order should require that the health professional who
prescribed the device inform the user of the problem and the steps necessary to reduce or
eliminate the risk.
344. Id. § 360h(b)(2).
345. Id. § 360h(b)(l)(A).
346. For example, tampons which complied with the state of the art when made but
later were suspected of causing toxic shock syndrome may not have been subject to a recall
order. Since the manufacturer agreed to a comprehensive recall plan, the FDA's authority
was not tested. Consent Agreement 2-11, In re Procter & Gamble Co. (consent agreement
Sept. 26, 1980) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
347. Two leading causes of device failure are improper use and inadequate mainte-
nance. COMPTROLLER GEN., GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFF., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES-PROBLEMS STILL TO
BE OVERCOME 30-31 (Sept. 30, 1983) [hereinafter cited as GAO DEVICE REPORT].
348. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a).
349. The FDA first proposed regulations to implement the reporting provision on No-
vember 18, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 76,183 (1980). These were withdrawn and new ones pro-
posed on May 27, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,014 (1983).
350. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
& COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA's NE-
GLECTED CHILD 21-27 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as DEVICE OVERSIGHT RE-
PORT]. In a 1982 survey, FDA staff inspected 40 manufacturers' complaint files and found
that 60% were either "poor or unusable." Id. at 25. FDA staff discovered that the files
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voluntary system has generated reports of only a small percentage
of manufacturer-initiated recalls.35 1 Many reports reach the FDA
months after manufacturers have conducted the recalls. 352 The
Agency has acknowledged that few device manufacturers report
problems with their products353 and that they often delay report-
ing until after completing recalls or taking other remedial
action.354
The legislative history of the Amendments indicates that Con-
gress intended to pattern the reporting requirements after those of
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the CPSA, and the RCHSA.3 55
However, the reporting requirements under these statutes
vary-from the broad provisions of the CPSA and the RCHSA to
the more restrictive provision of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 6
In its first proposed reporting rule in 1980, the FDA set forth
broad requirements357 similar to those under the CPSC's report-
ing regulations. 8 Responding to criticism that the proposed rule
was overbroad and unduly burdensome on manufacturers, the fol-
lowing year the FDA placed it in abeyance for further study.35 9
contained accounts of 3 deaths, 20 injuries, and 48 hazards that had not been reported
under the Agency's voluntary system. Id.
351. Perhaps only 15% of recalls are reported. Id. at 22; see also FDA Oversight: Medi-
cal Devices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1982) (testimony of Sidney M.
Wolfe, Director of Health Research Group, Public Citizen) [hereinafter cited as FDA Over-
sight Hearing] (FDA systematically has failed to implement reporting requirements of
Medical Device Amendments).
The low reporting rate is not surprising, given the possible adverse conse-
quences-recall, adverse publicity, and increased product liability claims. See supra note
223 and accompanying text. Even when reporting is mandatory, manufacturers are reluc-
tant to comply." See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
352. FDA Oversight Hearing, supra note 351, at 147. Public Citizen's Human Research
Group found that an average of three months elapsed between the time a manufacturer
notified its customers of a recall and publication of the recall in the FDA's Weekly En-
forcement Report. Id.
353. Problems reported by manufacturers often concern competitors' products, not
their own. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,014 at 24,016 (1983) (FDA statement accompanying reproposed
reporting regulation).
354. Id.
355. H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976).
356. See supra notes 55, 211, 319-20 and accompanying text.
357. 45 Fed. Reg. 76,183 (1980). The proposed rule would have required device manu-
facturers and distributors to submit reports to the FDA concerning devices (I) that may
have caused death or injury; (2) that may have a deficiency that could cause death or injury
or give misinformation resulting in improper treatment; or (3) that are subject to remedial
action. Remedial action included all steps by a manufacturer to correct any suspected or
confirmed device deficiency. Id.
358. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
359. 46 Fed. Reg. 57,568 (1981). The Agency explained that it needed to review coin-
1984]
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The FDA did not propose a new reporting rule for public
comment until May 1983.360 The reproposed rule is narrower
than the first, requiring reports only when the manufacturer be-
comes aware of an allegation, or has information that "reasonably
suggests," 361 that a device "has caused or contributed to a death or
serious injury or has malfunctioned, if recurrence of the malfunc-
tion is likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury. '362
"Serious injury" is broadly defined to include not only life-threat-
ening and permanent injury, but also "unanticipated temporary
impairment" of a bodily function or structure.363
Under the statute, failure to report a device defect renders the
device misbranded364 and subject to seizure or condemnation.365
The FDA can also enjoin a failure to report366 and criminally
prosecute those responsible. 367 The proposed rule indicates that
the FDA will use these enforcement tools to ensure compliance
with the reporting requirements.368
c. Implementing Procedures. The recall procedures under the
Device Amendments may be the most cumbersome of any en-
acted. If the FDA wishes to invoke the notification requirement,
it need merely consult with the manufacturer before ordering no-
tification. If it wishes to order both notice and corrective action,
however, it must hold an informal hearing369 and make the four
ments on the proposal, to review the proposal in light of an executive order requiring cost-
benefit and regulatory impact analyses, and to complete an inspection of company com-
plaint files to determine if inspections adequately could replace some of the proposed re-
porting requirements.
360. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,014 (1983).
361. Id. at 24,015.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 24,018. This category of injuries would include "electrical shocks, severe
lacerations, or broken bones"- injuries that are "not generally accepted as part of the risk
of using a device and are avoidable." Id.
364. 21 U.S.C. § 352(t) (1982).
365. Id. § 334.
366. See id. §§ 331(k), 332; see also id. § 331(q)(1) (making failure to report a violation
of the FDA Act which may be enjoined under § 332).
367. Id. § 333. A civil penalty provision, which the Device Amendments lack, might
be useful, especially in cases in which criminal prosecution seems unduly severe. See infra
note 436 and accompanying text.
368. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,014 at 24,022 (1983).
369. An informal hearing requires, inter alia, that the parties be given (I) "reasonable
notice of the matters to be considered at the hearing," (2) a comprehensive explanation of
the basis for the proposed action, (3) a "summary of the information which will be
presented," and (4) the opportunity to conduct questioning and present relevant oral and
written information. 21 U.S.C. § 3 2 1(y) (1982).
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findings discussed previously.37 0 If the FDA affirms its findings
following the hearing, it must permit the manufacturer to submit a
corrective action plan for its approval,371 and hold another infor-
mal hearing before it may disapprove the plan.372 If the Agency
does disapprove, it cannot mandate its own plan until it has al-
lowed the manufacturer to submit a revised plan and has provided
yet another informal hearing.37
If the manufacturer fails to comply with a recall order, the
FDA may bring an action in federal district court for an injunc-
tion compelling the recall 374 or initiate criminal proceedings.
375
The FDA also has authority to obtain court-ordered seizures of
adulterated or misbranded devices, 376 and to retain the devices
administratively for a short time until a court action can be
instituted.377
d. Voluntary Settlements. If the procedures for securing a re-
call under the Device Amendments were widely used, they would
render the scheme unworkable. But they were not intended to be
used often-Congress designed the agency-ordered recall as a
remedy of last resort, to be used only when voluntary actions
would not eliminate device risks.3 78 Indeed, the FDA's use of re-
call orders has comported with congressional intent. The Agency
has relied extensively on voluntary recalls-roughly 1,500 of them
since the Device Amendments were enacted.379 Seldom has the
FDA used its administrative authority, ordering defect notifica-
tion only three times, although it threatened administrative proce-
dures in another twenty-one cases, thereby inducing voluntary
recalls. 380 It has ordered no-cost repair only once.381 The FDA,
370. See supra notes 344-46 and accompanying text.
371. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(1)(A) (1982). The Agency may direct that a combination of
persons, such as the manufacturer, importer, and distributor, devise the plan, and may even
designate the person to make the final decision regarding the plan. Id.
372. Id. § 360h(b)(1)(B).
373. Id.
374. Failure to give the required notification or remedy is prohibited under 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(q) and can be enjoined under § 332(a).
375. Id.§ 333.
376. Id. § 334(a)(2)(D).
377. Id. § 334(g).
378. DEVICE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 350, at 11 (citing Bureau of Medical De-
vices, summary of regulatory activities from fiscal year 1976 through the first quarter of
fiscal year 1982).
379. Id. at 11-12.
380. Id. at 1.
381. Id. at 12. In 1978, the FDA ordered the manufacturer of a defibrillator to repair a
switch on the device.
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like the CPSC, has had far more success with its recall authority
than with its standard-setting authority under the Device
Amendments. 8 2
3. The Infant Formula Act of 1980
Following widely publicized recalls of several chloride-defi-
cient infant formulas in 1979,383 Congress passed the Infant
Formula Act of 1980.384 The Act lists the nutritional ingredients
that infant formula must contain 38 5 and requires manufacturers to
certify compliance with the Act before processing a formula.3 8 6
The Act does not give the FDA authority to order recalls of infant
formula. However, it anomalously includes provisions usually as-
sociated with recall authority, requiring manufacturers to report
product defects to the FDA and prescribing procedures to be fol-
lowed once a manufacturer decides to recall.
The reporting obligation arises when a manufacturer has
"knowledge which reasonably supports the conclusion" that a
formula either does not provide the statutorily required nutrients
or is adulterated or misbranded and, as such, presents a risk to
human health.3 7 "Knowledge" is defined as actual knowledge or
knowledge that a reasonable person would have had or obtained
in the exercise of due care under the circumstances.8 Once a
manufacturer files a report, the FDA decides, under its general
voluntary recall guidelines, 389 whether the manufacturer should
recall the formula; since the Infant Formula Act itself does not
establish criteria for initiating a recall. If the manufacturer volun-
tarily undertakes a recall, however, the Act prescribes certain re-
quirements that it must meet and authorizes the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to prescribe others by regulation.390
382. The FDA has not promulgated any performance standards under the Device
Amendments. GAO DEVICE REPORT, supra note 347, at 40; see supra notes 253-56 and
accompanying text (CPSC experience).
383. As a result of consuming the formulas, over 130 infants suffered injury from a rare
chemical imbalance with unknown long-term effects on their growth and development.
H.R. REP. No. 936, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980). For a discussion of events leading up to
the enactment of the Infant Formula Act, see Note, Food and Drug Law: The Infant
FormulaAct of 1980, 15 AKRON L. REV. 752 (1982).
384. 21 U.S.C. § 350a (1982).
385. Pub. L. No. 96-359, § 2, 94 Stat. 1190 (1980) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350a(g)
(1982)). The Secretary of Health and Human Services may revise the list. Id.
386. Id. § 350a(b)(2).
387. Id. § 350a(c)(1).
388. Id. § 350a(c)(2).
389. See infra notes 409-12 and accompanying text.
390. 21 U.S.C. § 350a(d)(1) (1982).
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During a recall, the manufacturer must report bi-weekly on its
actions, and the Secretary must review such actions every fifteen
days until the recall is terminated. 39' The regulations outline the
steps manufacturers must take in their recalls, giving them leeway
to tailor recalls to fit the circumstances.39 z The regulations also
require that if a recall is to be undertaken, the manufacturer
promptly notify the FDA by telephone. 393  The manufacturer
must assess the seriousness of the human health hazard posed by
the formula, devise a recall strategy appropriate to the risk, and
promptly notify consignees to return the products.394 It must fur-
nish the FDA with copies of its hazard evaluation, recall strategy,
and all recall notifications it has distributed.395 If the Agency
finds the strategy inadequate, it requires that further steps be
taken, such as a broader recall or more effectiveness checks.39 6
After the recall has begun, if the FDA finds that consignees did
not receive recall notifications or disregarded them "in a signifi-
cant number of cases," it may require additional notifications. 97
The Agency must approve the termination of the recall efforts.3 98
The recall provisions of the Infant Formula Act seem at odds
with the goals of the Act. By not requiring recalls and imposing
additional obligations on companies that undertake voluntary re-
calls, the statute creates a disincentive to voluntary recall. It is not
clear, however, that giving the FDA authority to order recalls
would add significantly to the current incentives to recall under
the FDA's general recall program.399
391. Id. § 350a(d)(1)(A) & (B). Id. § 350a(d)(1). These requirements stem from find-
ings that the FDA did not monitor adequately the recall of chloride-deficient formulas.
H.R. REP. No. 936, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980).
392. 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.70-.75 (1984). Congress intended that the "FDA. . . develop nec-
essary flexibility into their regulations to permit the tailoring of recall requirements to the
appropriate degree of risk." H.R. REP. No. 936, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980).
393. 21 C.F.R. § 7.72(a) (1984).
394. Id. § 7.71(a)-(c). The recall communication to consignees must be distinctive and
reflect the degree of hazard. It must instruct the consignees to report whether they possess
the recalled product, and must explain how the products may be returned to the manufac-
turer or otherwise disposed of. A follow-up communication must be sent to consignees that
do not respond to the first one. Id. § 7.7 1(c).
395. Id § 7.7 1(d).
396. Id. § 7.74. On the basis of its own or the firm's hazard evaluation, the FDA also
may conclude that the extent of the recall is inadequate.
397. Id. § 7.74(c).
398. Id. § 7.73.
399. See infra notes 426-30 and accompanying text.
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C. The Voluntary Recall Program
1. Background
The FDA's general recall program was prompted by a series of
poisonings in the mid-1950's. After issuing a public warning, the
FDA permitted the company to remove the product from the mar-
ket."° Although initially the FDA limited its activities to hazard-
ous products, in the 1960's it expanded its activities to products
that posed no health risk or other serious problem but neverthe-
less violated the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.4 ' The Agency
made no distinction between recalls involving trivial problems
and those addressing serious hazards. Inevitably, recalls became
so numerous that they could not be monitored properly, drasti-
cally undercutting the effectiveness of all recall efforts.40 2
In the mid-1960's, the FDA began publishing a weekly list to
provide regular public notification of recalls.40 3 Until 1971, how-
ever, the FDA's recall program functioned without published reg-
ulations governing its operation. Following congressional
hearings critical of the program, 4° the FDA published its first re-
call policy,40 5 establishing two categories of recall. One contained
products posing an imminent health risk, and the other products
posing a potential risk.406 The FDA's monitoring procedures va-
ried according to the risks posed.40 7 When congressional critics
deemed this policy inadequate, the FDA reevaluated its recall
program. As a result, it instituted a three-category system and
classified recalls by degree of product hazard.40 8 The three-tiered
program, which remains in effect, is unique among the major
agency recall programs.
2. Recall Guidelines
Under the FDA guidelines, Class I recalls are reserved for
400. Recall Procedures of the Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as FDA Recall Hearings].
401. Id. at 5-6. Products misbranded as to the weight of their contents, for example,
were covered by the recall program, although they presented no health risk or other serious
problem. Id. at 6. See also H.R. REP. No. 585, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1971).
402. FDA Recall Hearings, supra note 400, at 6-8.
403. HousE RECALL REPORT, supra note 309, at 4. Unfortunately, the Weekly En-
forcement Report often lists recalls after they have occurred. See supra note 352.
404. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
405. 36 Fed. Reg. 11,514 (1971).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (1984).
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products that pose a "reasonable probability" of causing serious
adverse health consequences or death.4 °9 Class II recalls cover
products that may cause temporary or medically reversible ad-
verse health consequences, and those presenting a remote risk of
such harm.410 Class III recalls involve products not likely to cause
adverse health consequences.4 1' The classification system applies
to medical devices as well as to products over which the FDA
lacks specific recall authority.412 The FDA publicizes all recall
classifications in its weekly report, which explains the classifica-
tion system and lists recalls by class. The Agency's Public Affairs
Office originated the classification scheme as a means of inform-
ing the public of the relative hazard posed by recalled products. 4 13
The FDA requests recalls only in "urgent situations" when the
manufacturer has not initiated one.41 4 FDA-requested recalls are
usually Class 1,4 " and require high-level Agency approval.41 6
The FDA develops an overall recall strategy for each case and
invites the firm to do likewise.417 The plan is tailored to the sever-
ity of the risk and the product's distribution level. It specifies the
depth of the recall (ie., whether to the wholesale, retail, or con-
sumer level),41 8 the necessity for public warning (usually reserved
for urgent situations),4 9 and the level of effectiveness checks,
which ranges from level A (100% of consignees contacted) to level
E (no effectiveness checks). 420
The FDA guidelines include general directives regarding the
409. FDA MANUAL, supra note 321, pt. 5, at 6.
410. Id.
411. Id. The FDA assesses the health risk on the basis of a number of factors and
assigns the recall classifications. 21 C.F.R. § 7.41 (1984).
412. 43 Fed. Reg. 26,202 (summary statement of basis and purpose).
413. Interview with Gary Dykstra, Special Assistant to the Associate Commissioner for
Regulatory Affairs of the FDA, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 5, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
Dykstra Interview]. The Agency, however, never has studied whether the classification
system has had an impact on recall responsiveness. Id.
414. FDA MANUAL, supra note 321, pt. 5, at 2.
415. Dykstra Interview, supra note 413. Only about 5% of the recalls of products under
FDA's jurisdiction fall into the Class I category.
416. The Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs approves most FDA recall
requests. FDA MANUAL, supra note 321, pt. 5, at 2.
417. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.45(b), .46 (1984); Dykstra Interview, supra note 413.
418. FDA MANUAL, supra note 321, pt. 5, at 6.
419. Id. at 8. Although recall actions are published in the FDA Weekly Enforcement
Report, the FDA or the recalling firm may release additional warnings to the general pub-
lic when serious health hazards or other circumstances dictate that such publicity is in the
public interest. Id.
420. Id. at 7-8.
1984]
458 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4W REVIEW [Vol. 34:401
format and contents of recall notices.421 Often only consignees,
not ultimate consumers, need be notified because the recall has
been initiated before the products reached the consumer.422 The
format and method of notification vary with the seriousness of the
risk.42 3 The firm must report its recall activities to the FDA at
specified intervals 424 until the recall has been terminated.425
3. Inducements To Recall
Like those regulated by NHTSA and the CPSC, manufactur-
ers subject to the FDA's jurisdiction undertake recalls to avoid or
minimize product liability claims and adverse publicity.4 26 The
FDA also boasts an array of enforcement tools, in addition to ad-
ministrative recall authority, for use in obtaining voluntary re-
calls. For example, the FDA may seek court-ordered seizure of
misbranded or adulterated products to remove them from the
market.427 It may also obtain injunctions prohibiting the distribu-
tion and sale of such products, 428 and criminal penalties for statu-
tory violations.429 To obviate these proceedings, the manufacturer
may agree to a recall.430
In practice, the FDA's statutory enforcement tools have not
always been effective. Seizure is frustrated because the products
are frequently distributed by the time the action is filed,43I and
421. 21 C.F.R. § 7.49 (1984).
422. Dykstra Interview, supra note 413.
423. Notice may be by telegram or first class letter. The envelope must bear notice in
bold red type that the letter concerns a recall, and also must be marked "URGENT"' in
Class I and Class II recalls. 21 C.F.R. § 7.49 (1984).
424. The reporting interval is from two to four weeks, depending on the recall's ur-
gency. Id. § 7.53(a).
425. The recall is completed when "the firm has actually retrieved and impounded all
outstanding product that could reasonably be expected to be recovered, or has completed
all product corrections." FDA MANUAL, supra note 321, Pt. 5, at 9.
426. For example, the prompt recall of Tylenol capsules after criminal tampering with
their containers had caused several deaths, helped reduce adverse publicity and allowed
the manufacturer to regain its market share-although at considerable expense. Bus. WK.,
Nov. 29, 1982, at 36; ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 99.
427. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1982).
428. Id.§ 332.
429. Id. § 333. This is strict criminal liability without proof that the violation was com-
mitted knowingly or willfully. See HOUSE RECALL REPORT, supra note 309, at 7-8.
430. The FDA has made clear its intent to use seizure or other court action when a
company refuses an FDA recall request. See FDA Recall Policy, 21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (1984).
Strict criminal liability can be a powerful incentive to voluntary recalls. Interview with
Leonard Stauffer, Chief of the Recalls and Notification Branch, National Center for De-
vices and Radiological Health, FDA, in Silver Spring, Md. (Nov. 6, 1983).
431. See GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFF., LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES
ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE REGULATION OF DRUG INDUSTRY 12-13 (Apr. 5, 1983) [herein-
PRODUCT PECALLS
because several actions may be required when distribution is na-
tionwide.43 z While it may be procedurally superior in cases of na-
tionwide distribution, the injunction is inferior to seizure because
of its prospective application-the decree normally restrains fur-
ther sale or distribution and does not remove products from the
market. The government has sought injunctive relief in the form
of court-ordered recall, but its statutory authority to do so is un-
clear.433 It has used criminal penalties infrequently.4 34
More effective enforcement devices would indirectly serve to
improve the recall program. Useful additional tools under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act include: (1) specific authorization
for the FDA to seek court-ordered recalls in injunctive actions,435
(2) civil penalties for violations now subject only to criminal pen-
alties, 436 and (3) authorization for the Agency to issue ex parte
detention orders against products until a seizure action can be
filed.4 37 If these tools are provided, giving the FDA general recall
authority would be unnecessary and perhaps counterproductive.
Following the example of the Medical Device Amendments,438
Congress might require cumbersome administrative hearing pro-
cedures before the Agency could exercise its recall authority,
after cited as GAO DRUG REGULATION STUDY]. In a survey of 35 FDA-recommended
seizures, the study found that products were seized in only nine cases. By the time the
FDA had approved the actions (an average of 61 days), the U.S. Attorney's Office had
brought them, and the court orders had been issued (an average of 34 days), the products
already had been shipped. Id
432. See generally Schwartz, Protecting Consumer Health and Safety The Needfor Co-
ordinated Regulation Among Federal Agencier, 43 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 1031, 1037-38
(1975) (discussing disadvantages of seizure action).
433. Courts are split on whether they may order recalls under the injunction provision
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See United States v. C.E.B. Prods., 380 F. Supp.
664, 667-68 (N.D. I11. 1974) (statute contemplates "only negative injunctions," not affirma-
tive recall remedy). But see United States v. K-N Enters., 461 F. Supp. 988, 990 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (statutes injunction authority is broad enough to include affirmative relief; court's
general equity power is sufficient to order recalls since statute does not preclude it).
434. From 1977 to 1981, the yearly number of criminal prosecutions averaged 23, com-
pared with over 450 yearly seizures. Off. of Pub. Affairs, Food & Drug Admin., Talk Paper
3 (Aug. 25, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Talk Paper].
435. See supra note 433.
436. Criminal penalties, a harsh sanction, are pursued infrequently. See supra note
434. Civil penalties, however, can be effective. See supra notes 214,216 and accompanying
text (CPSC experience). The FDA can seek civil penalties under the RCHSA. See supra
note 334 and accompanying text.
437. The power to detain products pending seizure would make the seizure action more
effective and a viable alternative to recall in more cases. See GAO DRUG REGULATION
STUDY, supra note 431, at 15 (recommending that FDA be given administrative detention
authority over drug products).
438. See supra notes 369-73 and accompanying text.
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thereby lengthening the time involved in obtaining a recall under
the voluntary program. The administrative recall authority con-
tained in the Device Amendments and the RCHSA has not
greatly enhanced the FDA's ability to negotiate recalls under
those statutes. Given the long history and maturity of the FDA's
voluntary program, administrative recall authority is currently
unnecessary.439
Recall effectiveness demands more than mere availability of
an array of statutory enforcement tools. The FDA must use its
tools with sufficient frequency to convince manufacturers that vol-
untary recalls are warranted. Nevertheless, FDA enforcement ac-
tions have become less frequent,4 40  apparently signaling
manufacturers that they may avoid adverse consequences if they
do not report or agree to a recall. A sharp drop in the number of
voluntary recalls has accompanied the FDA's decreased enforce-
ment efforts.44' The Agency must utilize its enforcement powers
to enhance the effectiveness of its voluntary recall program. A
wider range of enforcement options would assist in that attempt.
4. Reporting Defects
Aside from the specific reporting requirements under the
RCHSA,44  and the Infant Formula Act," 3 manufacturers have
no general statutory obligation to report product hazards and de-
fects to the FDA. Although there is an adverse reaction reporting
439. The FDA has been deterred from seeking administrative authority to order re-
calls, partly by the fear that additional administrative procedures could delay recalls. In-
terview with Linda R. Horton, Deputy Chief Counsel for Regulations and Hearings of the
FDA, in Rockville, Md. (July 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Horton Interview].
440. See PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, REPORT ON DECREASED FDA
LAW ENFORCEMENT DURING 1981 (1982). In 1981, there were 577 enforcement actions,
compared with an average of 1,041 for the years 1977 to 1980, a decrease of 45%. Id. at 1;
see also Talk Paper, supra note 434, at 3-4 (showing similar drop in enforcement actions).
441. See Talk Paper, supra note 434, at 4. From 1977 to 1980, the number of recalls
averaged over 1,000 a year;, in 1981 there were 658 recalls. The FDA has attributed the
decrease to long-term trends such as improved manufacturing practices, greater industry
cooperation in complying with the law, and clarification of the legal requirements by the
FDA. See id. Critics maintain that these factors do not explain the sudden, sharp drop in
FDA enforcement actions and recalls during 1981. Interview with Allen Greenberg, Staff
Associate of the Public Citizen Health Research Group, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 12,
1983). Since 1981, however, the number of enforcement actions has risen steadily. Dykstra
Interview, supra note 413.
442. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 387-88 and accompanying text. Reporting requirements also have
been proposed for the Medical Device Amendments. See supra note 349 and accompany-
ing text.
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provision for prescription drugs,' items such as cosmetics and
foods are not covered. A general reporting requirement should be
imposed to provide the Agency with early notice of problems and
enable timely publicity of recalls.4 5 Without such a requirement,
companies lack the incentive to report,"' 6 and fail to do so."
7
5. Classifying Recalls
The FDA's recall classification system has been recommended
for adoption by NHTSA and the CPSC to improve public aware-
ness of the relative risks of recalled products. Ironically, the FDA
has considered abandoning the system because it makes negotiat-
ing recalls more difficult.44 Companies resist Class I designation
because of the potential impact on product liability suits and the
possibility of adverse publicity." 9 Companies view the designa-
tion as punitive, prompting agency concern that it discourages
voluntary reporting and product recalls.45° When the classifica-
tion issue prolongs recall negotiations, it delays and diminishes
recall effectiveness.45' In fact, classification may be less important
for the FDA than for the CPSC and NHTSA-unlike those of the
other two Agencies, FDA recalls do not often reach the consumer
level,452 where a classification system would be most useful. Nev-
ertheless, before abandoning classification, the FDA should study
its effect on recall response rates.453
6. Recommendations
The FDA should continue operating under its voluntary recall
program but with additional statutory enforcement tools for use
when voluntarism fails. Congress should authorize the Agency to
444. See 21 U.S.C. § 335(i), (j) (1982).
445. Recalls often appear in the Weekly Enforcement Report after they have occurred.
See supra notes 352, 354 and accompanying text.
446. The threat of adverse publicity and product liability claims discourages reporting,
Dykstra Interview, supra note 413; thus firms are unwilling to make reports not required by
statute. ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 99.
447. See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
448. Dykstra Interview, supra note 413.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. The longer it takes to negotiate a recall, the more likely the products will be dis-
tributed and the more difficult it will be to recall them. Id.
452. In food recalls, which frequently never reach the consumer level, a 50% return rate
is considered very good. In drug and device recalls, institutional users and medical profes-
sionals often must be notified instead of consumers. Id.
453. The FDA never has studied the impact or importance of its classification system.
Id.
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detain products pending a seizure action, to seek court-ordered
recalls, and to pursue civil penalties where only criminal penalties
are now available.454
Although the FDA administers a hodgepodge of recall provi-
sions under three statutes, this scheme has not created serious dif-
ficulties. The one area warranting uniformity, however, is
reporting; companies should be obligated by statute to notify the
FDA of defects and statutory violations that could create health or
safety risks. Finally, the Agency should continue to classify and
publicize the classification of its recalls.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although NHTSA, the CPSC, and the FDA make extensive
use of recalls to implement their statutes, recalls have inherent
limitations as enforcement tools. Consumers can and sometimes
do render them ineffective by failing to respond. Moreover, re-
calls are generally successful only if promptly (Ze., voluntarily)
undertaken. Recalcitrant firms can thwart them merely by invok-
ing available administrative procedures and, indeed, have good
reason to do so. Companies cannot insure against product liabil-
ity claims by recalling defective products-to the contrary, recalls
can stimulate additional lawsuits and bring adverse publicity. Re-
calls also can be very expensive, requiring refunds or replace-
ments of products that have already been produced and marketed.
Ultimately, what may be most surprising is the frequency with
which companies agree to recalls without litigation.
Because of its superior effectiveness, the recall remedy remains
the major enforcement mechanism of the three Agencies. Recalls
have virtually supplanted standards as the primary regulatory tool
of the CPSC, for example. From the agencies' standpoint, their
popularity stems from several factors. First, recalls promote
safety. Although response rates are lower than agencies would
like, consumers in significant numbers do return, discard, or take
greater precautions with recalled products. Second, agencies can
use recalls to set quasi-standards, establishing precedent for what
constitutes an unacceptably hazardous product. Third, recalls are
quicker and more efficient than standard-setting-government
and industry often share a sense of urgency in removing a hazard-
ous product from the marketplace. This has led agencies to adopt
informal, flexible settlement procedures that encourage firms to
454. See supra notes 435-37 and accompanying text.
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agree to recalls. Industry also may prefer recalls to standards be-
cause recalls generally affect only manufacturers of unsafe prod-
ucts. Unlike many standards, recalls do not impose across-the-
board certification requirements and may involve less burden-
some recordkeeping.
Agencies must reconcile numerous and often competing inter-
ests when implementing recall programs. They must take care not
to inundate the public with recalls at the risk of creating consumer
apathy. They must stress voluntary agreements to achieve prompt
and effective recalls, yet be willing to use their enforcement pow-
ers when voluntary efforts stall. They must be flexible in negotiat-
ing the terms of recalls to encourage voluntarism, yet ensure
adequate notice and remedy for product owners.
In addition to the agency-specific recommendations discussed
throughout, this Article suggests that agencies work together to
develop a more uniform approach to recalls.455 Despite vast dif-
ferences among the agencies' programs, they have common char-
acteristics and goals. All must deal with the general public.
Agencies would benefit from sharing their knowledge about re-
calls, and the public would benefit from more consistency in the
recall programs. The following recommendations should help to
achieve these goals. First, an interagency recall liaison group con-
sisting of representatives from all agencies with recall programs
should be established. Its purpose would be to educate members
about each other's programs and to research areas of common in-
terest, such as how to improve consumer response rates and how
to use new technology to improve recall notification.4 6 Second,
the liaison group could explore the possibility of coordinating the
agencies' classification systems. This would permit agencies to use
455. In 1979, the CPSC convened a meeting of representatives from six agencies en-
gaged in product recalls (FDA, EPA, USDA, FTC, NHTSA and CPSC) to explore coordi-
nating recalls and improving interagency communications. See, e.g., Letter from Susan B.
Y Ing, Chairman of the CPSC, to Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of the FDA (Feb. 15,
1979,
456. "/here is precedent for such a group. On September 26, 1977, the CPSC, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, the FDA, and the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration established an Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) to pursue
cooperative efforts among the Agencies. One of the specific cooperative efforts was compli-
ance and enforcement, although no work on recalls was undertaken. At the expiration of
the IRLG's four-year charter, the Reagan Administration substituted a substantially
trimmed liaison body called the Regulatory Work Group on Science and Technology. The
new group has no compliance and enforcement component. In the interagency meeting on
recalls, see supra note 455, the participants targeted areas for joint exploration to improve
recall effectiveness but established no ongoing working group to pursue them. Interagency
Meeting, supra note 1; Horton Interview, supra note 439.
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similar methods of assessing risk and designating risk level.
Third, a central hotline switchboard for consumer inquiries and
complaints is needed. Consumers do not always know which
agency takes complaints or has information about recalls. A cen-
tral switchboard could refer all calls to the appropriate agency for
experienced operators to handle. Fourth, the agencies should
publish prompt weekly reports of recalls. Only the FDA regularly
publishes a list of recalls. Each agency should provide this infor-
mation and distribute it to bodies such as state and local consumer
offices and public interest consumer groups. 457 The implementa-
tion of these general recommendations, along with the agency-
specific ones, could make the recall a more effective remedial
device.
457. The National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators (NACAA) com-
piles information on the recalls of NHTSA, the FDA, and the CPSC which it publishes
monthly in its Recall Clearinghouse Service. Subscribers include state and local consumer
offices and agencies. Telephone interview with Claudia J. Sturges, Director of Member
Services of the NACAA (Oct. 18, 1983). Data on recalls are not easy to collect from the
agencies, even for the knowledgeable staff of NACAA. Id. To make this information
more accessible, the agencies should publish it on a regular and timely basis.
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